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General introduction
One of the most important features of globalization during the last 20 years is the increased
fragmentation of production and the growth of foreign direct investment (FDI). Since the
early 1980s direct investment by multinational firms has grown almost twice as fast as trade
flows (UNCTAD, 2004). As a result, multinational firms have become major players in the
global economy. They organize their production on a global scale in a number of different
ways, and an increasing share of world trade is now so-called intra-firm trade conducted
within multinationals. In the economic literature, these global trends have generated a
considerable interest in multinationals and their effects on host countries. In addition,
many countries have put favorable policies in place to attract inward FDI.
So, why do multinationals emerge? Dunning (1981) argues that three conditions need to
be present in order for firms to undertake FDI. Dunning’s framework has become known as
the OLI-framework: Ownership, Location and Internalization. The ownership advantage
could be a product or some knowledge that other firms do not have access to. This
ownership advantage gives the firm some market power or cost advantage that is sufficient
to overcome the extra costs of operating abroad. The location advantage is needed to ensure
that it is profitable to establish foreign production rather than to export to the foreign
market. Finally, the internalization advantage ensures that the ownership advantage is
most profitably exploited within the firm in a subsidiary, rather than through a market
process as, for example, through licensing. Recent theories of international trade also
predict that it is the more efficient firms that engage in international activities, be it
exporting or FDI (Antràs, 2003; Antràs and Helpman, 2004).1 These models generate
predictions about both the location of activities and the degree of internalization or control
1Antràs and Helpman (2004) combine the heterogeneous firm framework developed by Melitz (2003)
with organizational theories of the firm as in Grossman and Hart (1986).
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of the different stages of production of firms.
Given the advantage of multinationals predicted by the frameworks above, there is
a possibility that some of this advantage can be picked up by local firms in the host
country through knowledge spillovers. Knowledge spillovers can occur through two main
channels; local firms may be able to directly copy or imitate the products or processes
of multinationals, or they may hire labour previously employed in multinationals. In
addition, FDI may increase product market competition and thus induce local firms to
perform better in order to survive. The competition effect could in principle come about
even if the multinational has no productivity advantage over local firms.
Faced with the possibility of knowledge spillovers that may erode the firm-specific ad-
vantage of the multinational after entry into a host country, the multinationals may be
reluctant to transfer technology to their subsidiaries, or they may make attempts to limit
knowledge spillovers. Spillovers can be limited for instance by paying higher wages in
order to reduce labour mobility, as in Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002).
Alternatively, firms may prefer to export to new markets rather than to produce locally
by establishing subsidiaries. The trade-off between FDI and exports is considered in theo-
retical models by Markusen (2001), Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), and Siotis (1999).2
In all these models, the multinational produces one product, and spillovers from a sub-
sidiary can erode the market power of the multinational. Hence, these models abstract
from a vertical production structure and assume only horizontal spillovers. Though multi-
nationals may want to limit horizontal spillovers to potential competitors, the issue may
be rather different when considering also intermediate inputs used in the production of a
final good. As multinationals may benefit from more productive local suppliers, the incen-
tives for limiting vertical spillovers to suppliers may not be present, see Moran (2001) and
Smarzynska-Javorcik (2004).
In the first chapter of the thesis, I depart from the assumption of horizontal spillovers
and consider how strategic behaviour generated by vertical spillovers may affect a multina-
tional’s mode of entry into a new market. The model includes elements from recent work
on outsourcing versus internal production of intermediate inputs by Grossman and Help-
man (2002), but retains a partial equilibrium framework in order to consider spillovers and
strategic interaction. I find that upstream spillovers affect the strategic interaction between
the downstream multinational and the local upstream firm very differently depending on
the type of outsourcing relationship; where the outsourcing relationships considered are
2See Markusen (1995) for a discussion of the licensing versus FDI trade-off
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incomplete outsourcing contracts and successive monopoly. It turns out that threat of
upstream entry will not benefit the MNE in the case of incomplete outsourcing contracts,
while the result is the opposite in the case of successive monopoly.
While the first chapter in this thesis, along with most theoretical papers on FDI-
spillovers, takes the presence of spillovers in the form of a pure externality for granted,
there is a large literature searching for empirical evidence of spillovers. In the empirical
literature the concept of spillovers is used as a general term to capture both knowledge
diffusion and possible competition effects. As it is difficult to measure knowledge flows,
the preferred measure for such spillovers is to look for its effect on the productivity of
firms. The standard study of FDI-spillovers is conducted within a production function
framework by regressing a measure of total factor productivity or labour productivity on
input use and one or more variables to represent foreign presence in the industry, while
controlling for firm and industry characteristics. If the coefficient on foreign presence is
positive and significant, this is interpreted as evidence of positive spillovers from FDI. The
first statistical studies of spillovers used cross-sectional aggregate industry level data, and
they generally concluded that FDI is associated with positive spillovers.3
The major drawback of cross-sectional studies is the simultaneity problem. If a positive
correlation between FDI and the productivity of local firms is found, is this due to spillovers
or a tendency of foreign firms to locate in the most productive sectors? The simultaneity
problem can be eliminated with plant level panel data. Such data were first used in the
spillover-studies by Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Aitken and Harrison (1999), with data
from Morocco and Venezuela, respectively. A large number of other studies have followed,
and the verdict on the results of these studies seems to be that there is no clear evidence
of positive spillovers from foreign-owned to host country firms in the same industry, see
the recent survey by Görg and Greenaway (2004). Results seem to depend, among other
things, on which host countries and time periods are studied, the methods used and the
definition of foreign presence, see the meta-analysis in Görg and Strobl (2001).4
One argument put forward to explain the conflicting results on horizontal or intra-
industry spillovers is that foreign-owned firms, at least in the short run, may steal market
3Among the first studies of FDI-spillovers are the papers by Caves (1974), Globerman (1979), and
Blomström and Persson (1983), using industry level data from Australia, Canada and Mexico, respectively.
4As argued by Smarzynska-Javorcik (2004), spillovers within industries may be less likely than spillovers
across industries. Using data from Lithuania, she finds evidence of spillovers from multinationals to
domestic firms in sectors that provide intermediate inputs for the multinationals. See also Kugler (2006)
for similar arguments and results from Columbia.
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shares from domestic firms and, thereby, force them up their average cost curves. This
implies that the measured productivity of domestic firms will be lower and we will ob-
serve a negative effect from FDI (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). This contrasts with the
general view that increased competition induces more effort in local firms and therefore
raises their productivity. It is not possible to distinguish any competition effects from
knowledge diffusion in productivity regressions that only include variables to represent the
extent of foreign presence in the industry. By introducing proxies for competition in the
spillover regressions, the coefficient on foreign presence ideally captures only the effect of
knowledge diffusion, while the competition effect of FDI is captured by the competition
variable, see Haskel et al. (2002). Sembenelli and Siotis (2005) use a different approach
to disentangle the competition and knowledge diffusion effects of FDI on the profitability
of Spanish manufacturing firms. Their main argument is that the competition effect is
likely to become effective quickly after ownership change, while knowledge diffusion may
take time to materialise. Thus they identify short-term effects as competition effects, while
long-term effects are interpreted as spillovers.
The second chapter of the thesis, coauthored with Stefanie A. Haller, deals with the
competition versus knowledge diffusion effects of FDI on host country firms. We depart
from Haskel et al. (2002) and Sembenelli and Siotis (2005) by arguing that the use of
a single measure of overall foreign presence in a sector may hide different effects of new
foreign entrants and foreign firms that have been in the market for a while. In particular,
an increase in competitive pressure from foreign presence should be more prevalent from
new foreign entrants. Among the new entrants, the effect of greenfield entrants and for-
eign acquisitions may also differ, as greenfield entry adds new production capacity in the
sector while acquisition initially leaves production capacity unchanged. We use Norwegian
manufacturing data to investigate how the productivity of domestic firms is affected by
recent foreign entrants, separated by mode of entry, and long established foreign-owned
firms. Our main finding is that greenfield entry is associated with a negative effect on the
productivity growth of domestic plants, while foreign acquisitions have the opposite effect.
Another reason for the unclear results in the spillover-literature could be that the
empirical studies treat the channels through which spillovers may occur as a black box. The
third chapter of the thesis investigates empirically the common claim that labour mobility
is an important channel for spillovers from multinationals to host country firms. To the
best of my knowledge this is the first paper using extensive linked employer-employee data
to investigate this issue. In the existing spillover-literature the use of a measure of foreign
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presence at the industry level cannot capture the fact that firms within the same industry
have different degrees of contact with foreign firms. Domestic firms with explicit contacts
with foreign firms may be the most likely to benefit from knowledge diffusion.5 With the
Norwegian linked employer-employee data I am able to construct plant-specific measures
representing the share of workers in domestic firms with experience from multinationals
located in Norway. I find that these workers contribute 20-25% more to the productivity
of their domestic plants than the workers without multinational experience. The result is
consistent with labour mobility being a channel for knowledge diffusion. In addition, when
comparing the contribution to plant level productivity from workers with experience from
multinationals to the wage-reward to multinational experience that these workers get, I
conclude that the evidence of knowledge diffusion is also consistent with elements of a pure
knowledge externality.
The empirical literature on host country effects of FDI has mainly been interested
in the indirect effects through productivity spillovers, while other effects of FDI in host
countries are less studied. As multinationals tend to be larger, do more research and devel-
opment, use more advanced technology and pay higher wages than purely domestic firms,
an increase in the share of foreign-owned firms in a host country may have a substantial
compositional effect, even without any spillovers taking place. For instance, an increase
in the share of highly productive foreign-owned firms will raise aggregate productivity in
the host country. The final chapter of the thesis (coauthored with Stefanie A. Haller)
calculates the contribution of foreign-owned firms to productivity growth and employment
creation in Norwegian manufacturing.
5Examples of contacts between foreign and domestic firms in addition to labour mobility, could be
technology licensing, cooperation in research and development, and exchange of intermediate inputs. Un-
fortunately, information at the firm or plant level on such links between foreign and domestic firms is
rarely available.
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Summary
The thesis consists of four self-contained chapters; one theoretical and three empirical.
The common topic for all four chapters is foreign direct investment and spillovers or other
host country effects. The three empirical chapters use panel data to investigate different
aspects of the effect of foreign direct investment into Norwegian manufacturing. The
following contains a short summary of each of the four chapters.
Multinationals’ mode of entry with presence of upstream spillovers
Multinationals’ mode of entry into a new market may depend on whether or not they ex-
pect spillovers to generate new competition. Existing theoretical models where the mode of
entry is affected by spillovers, consider spillovers in the same market as the multinational
sells its final product (horizontal spillovers). By contrast, I model the effects spillovers
of intermediate input technology (upstream spillovers) have on a multinational’s mode of
entry. In the model a multinational (MNE) controls the technology for producing both the
final good and a specialized intermediate input used in the assembly of the final good. The
MNE establishes an assembly plant in a new market where it has monopoly power for the
final good, and the organizational choice concerns how to get intermediate inputs to its
new assembly plant. The MNE can import the specialized inputs from its home plant, or
it can save on input trade costs by getting the inputs locally; either by vertically integrated
production, or by outsourcing to a local supplier. Vertically integrated production of the
intermediate input gives higher unit costs than specialized production in a local supplier,
while outsourcing suffers from inefficiencies generated by the interaction between the sup-
plier and the buyer. In addition, outsourcing to a local supplier gives rise to spillovers and
threat of entry of a new supplier.
I show how the possibility of upstream spillovers affects the strategic interaction between
the downstream MNE and the local upstream firm differently depending on the outsourc-
ing contract, and how this affects the trade-offs between the various organizational choices
of the MNE. I consider two types of outsourcing contracts, incomplete outsourcing con-
tracts, and a contract where the MNE gives the supplier the right to set the price of the
intermediate input as in a successive monopoly. With incomplete outsourcing contracts,
threat of upstream entry has the effect of improving the outside option of the MNE in
the negotiations with the incumbent supplier. It turns out that in most cases the MNE is
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unable to use the threat of upstream entry to its own benefit. With successive monopoly,
the incumbent supplier reacts to the threat of entry by reducing its price in order to keep
the potential entrant out of the market, and this clearly benefits the MNE. If upstream
spillovers are expected to occur, the MNE may let the supplier set the price of inputs as a
monopolist in order to take advantage of the competition effect from future spillovers.
Foreign firms and host-country productivity: Does the mode of
entry matter?
With Stefanie A. Haller, Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin.
A large empirical literature has examined whether foreign presence in an industry gives
rise to productivity spillovers to local firms in the same industry, without coming up with
a clear-cut conclusion. Foreign firms are both potential sources of knowledge diffusion
and sources of competition. Though the competition effect may well be positive, it has
been argued that in the short run foreign firms are equally likely to steal market shares
from domestic firms and, thereby give rise to a negative effect on the measured produc-
tivity of domestic firms. We argue that a change in competitive pressure due to foreign
presence should primarily come from new foreign entrants, and not from long established
foreign-owned firms. Among the new foreign entrants, greenfield entry increases produc-
tion capacity and therefore also competition, while acquisitions do not necessarily have
an immediate impact on market structure. In turn, if knowledge externalities take time
to materialise, spillovers are more likely to originate from foreign firms that have been in
the market for a while. Thus, the estimated effects of overall foreign presence on domestic
productivity could conceal very different effects from new foreign entrants and existing
foreign firms.
To investigate this, we split the measure of foreign presence commonly used in the
literature into three terms representing greenfield entry, acquisition entry and existing
foreign-owned firms in a sector. Using 24 years of comprehensive panel data for Norwegian
Manufacturing, we find that greenfield entry has a negative impact on the productivity
growth of domestic plants. The effect seems to be caused by domestic plants not adjusting
their use of inputs (in particular labour) when reducing their output due to market share
losses. Thus, greenfield entry can be associated with a negative competition effect. In
contrast, we find a positive and significant effect of foreign acquisitions in low-concentration
sectors. This suggests that existing linkages between the acquired plant and other domestic
17
plants may facilitate knowledge spillovers.
Is mobility of labour a channel for spillovers from multinationals to
local domestic firms?
In this chapter I use matched employer-employee data to investigate the frequent claim
in the spillover-literature that labour mobility is a channel for knowledge spillovers from
MNEs to non-MNEs. As a first exercise to assess the potential for spillovers, I estimate
individual wage equations for manufacturing workers, where I control for plant and indi-
vidual characteristics and include dummies for foreign and domestic MNEs. I find that
foreign MNEs in Norwegian manufacturing pay a wage premium of 2.5 percent relative to
non-MNEs, while Norwegian MNEs seem to give a wage premium only to workers with high
education. Second, I document the extent of labour mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs in
Norwegian manufacturing during the 1990s. I find that each year on average only around
1 percent of workers in MNEs leave to join a non-MNE. However, this translates into a
growing percentage of workers in non-MNEs with previous experience from MNEs. In
the year 2000, 45 percent of non-MNEs employed one or more workers with recent MNE
experience.
Third, I find that domestic plants that hire workers with previous experience from
MNEs benefit in terms of increased productivity. Workers with MNE experience contribute
20-25 percent more to total factor productivity than workers without experience from
MNEs. This result is consistent with the idea that labour mobility from MNEs to non-
MNEs is a channel for spillovers. Finally, I find that movers from MNEs to non-MNEs
with more than 3 years of experience from MNEs receive a wage premium of almost 5
percent compared to their new colleagues, thus experience from MNEs is clearly valued
by non-MNEs. For movers in the other direction; from non-MNEs to MNEs, there is no
such wage premium. The difference between the private returns to mobility for movers
from MNEs to non-MNEs and the productivity effect at the plant level, suggests that the
hiring non-MNEs do not fully pay for the value of these workers. Thus, labour mobility
from MNEs to non-MNEs seems to be a source of knowledge externality in Norwegian
manufacturing.
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The contribution of foreign entrants to employment
and productivity growth
With Stefanie A. Haller, Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin.
While it is recognized that the presence of foreign firms in a host country may affect
the performance of domestic firms indirectly through knowledge spillovers, the direct effect
foreign entry has by changing the composition of firms in the host country is less studied.
As foreign firms tend to be larger and more productive than domestic firms, a rise in the
share of foreign firms in a host country may increase aggregate productivity even without
any spillovers taking place. Foreign firms usually source labour locally, and this may
increase demand for labour in the case of greenfield entry. Foreign acquisitions, however,
are often associated with fears of job losses as the new foreign owners are expected to
restructure the acquired plant to increase efficiency. Moreover, job security may decrease
as it may be easier for multinationals than for purely domestic firms to shift production
between locations in different countries.
We compare employment and productivity dynamics in foreign and domestic entrants,
exitors, survivors and acquisitions in Norwegian manufacturing from 1979 to 2000. We
calculate job creation and job destruction rates, and examine productivity levels and con-
tributions to productivity growth for the different groups of plants. We find that all types
of foreign plants are on average more productive than their domestic counterparts, while
there is more job reallocation in domestic than in foreign plants. Foreign owners do not
seem to target highly productive plants for acquisition. Rather, they tend to reverse a
negative trend in productivity and employment in the acquired plant. During the boom
from 1992 to 1997 foreign acquisitions were major contributors to employment generation
and productivity growth, and foreign plants taken together, with a market share of 38%,
accounted for 61% of productivity growth.
Chapter 1
Multinationals’ mode of entry with
presence of upstream spillovers
Abstract
Multinationals’ mode of foreign expansion may depend on whether or not they
expect technological externalities or spillovers to generate new competition. I
consider a monopoly firm with a vertical production structure and three pos-
sible modes of entry, one of which includes outsourcing of intermediate input
production to a host country firm. Technological spillovers generate threat of
entry of a new intermediate input producer. The ability of the downstream
multinational to benefit from such upstream spillovers, depends on the nature
of the outsourcing relationship. When outsourcing contracts are incomplete
and the two firms bargain over how to share the potential surplus, upstream
spillovers do not benefit the multinational downstream. If the multinational in-
stead allows the supplier to set the price of intermediates (successive monopoly)
the multinational clearly benefits from upstream spillovers.
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1.1 Introduction
Multinationals’ mode of entry into a new market may depend on whether or not they ex-
pect technological externalities or spillovers to generate new competition. Existing models
where the mode of entry is affected by spillovers, consider spillovers in the same market as
the multinational sells its final product (horizontal spillovers). Typically, when the multina-
tional expects that spillovers may generate new competition after establishing a subsidiary,
it may choose to enter the new market through exports rather than through foreign direct
investment (FDI).1 By contrast, this chapter focuses on the impact spillovers of interme-
diate input technology (called upstream spillovers) have on a downstream multinational’s
mode of foreign expansion.
There is a large empirical literature looking for horizontal (or intra-industry) spillovers
from FDI in the form of productivity effects in local firms, see Görg and Greenaway (2004)
for a survey. Results are ambiguous, and Smarzynska-Javorcik (2004) argues that since
multinationals have incentives to limit spillovers of their final good technology, while they
may benefit from more productive local suppliers, knowledge spillovers to suppliers may
be more likely than horizontal spillovers (see also Moran, 2001; Blalock and Gertler, 2005;
Kugler, 2006). Despite the documented increase in vertical fragmentation of production
(Hummels et al., 2001), theoretical work on vertical technology transfer and spillovers
in the upstream market hardly exists. One exception is Pack and Saggi (2001), who
discuss vertical technology transfer through outsourcing. They focus on how spillovers
that generate threat of both upstream and downstream entry affect profits. Building on
their model, Goh (2005) endogenizes the vertical technology transfer decision and studies
how spillovers affect the incentives to transfer knowledge to a supplier.
Rather than taking the outsourcing decision as given, I focus on how upstream spillovers
affect a multinational’s preferred mode of entry, where outsourcing is one of three possibili-
ties. The setting of the model is one where a multinational (MNE) controls the technology
for producing both the final good and a specialized intermediate input used in the assem-
bly of the final good. The MNE is going to establish a subsidiary (an assembly plant)
in a new market where it has monopoly power for the downstream product. The three
organizational choices differ with respect to how the MNE gets intermediate inputs to its
new assembly plant.
1The export versus FDI trade-off with horizontal spillovers is modelled in Fosfuri et al. (2001), Glass
and Saggi (2002), Markusen (2001), Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) and Siotis (1999). See Markusen
(1995) for a discussion of the licensing versus FDI trade-off.
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One alternative is to import the intermediate input to the new assembly plant from the
home plant of the MNE. Alternatively, the MNE can save on input trade costs by getting
the intermediate input locally; either by vertically integrated production within the new
subsidiary, or by outsourcing to a local supplier. In this ‘make or buy’ decision, we follow
Grossmann and Helpman (2002) in assuming that a firm specialized in manufacturing
intermediates has lower unit costs than a vertically integrated firm due to the benefits of
specialization. Outsourcing, on the other hand, suffers from inefficiencies generated by
the interaction between the supplier and the buyer. We consider two types of outsourcing
contracts, incomplete outsourcing contracts as used in Grossman and Helpman (2002),
Ottaviano and Turrini (2003), and Antràs and Helpman (2004), and a contract where the
MNE gives the supplier the right to set the price of the intermediate input in a successive
monopoly as in Pack and Saggi (2001).2
Though the two types of outsourcing contracts give the MNE different profit levels,
the main point of this chapter is to show how the possibility of upstream spillovers affects
the strategic interaction between the downstream and upstream firm in very different ways
depending on the outsourcing contract. In turn, this affects the trade-offs between the
various organizational choices of the MNE. Upstream spillovers imply that the knowledge
of how to produce the specialized intermediate input may spread to another local firm,
which gives the MNE potential access to a new supplier. With incomplete outsourcing
contracts, threat of upstream entry has the effect of improving the outside option of the
MNE in the negotiations with the incumbent supplier. It turns out that in most cases the
MNE is unable to use the threat of upstream entry to its own benefit. With successive
monopoly, the incumbent supplier reacts to the threat of entry by reducing its price in
order to keep the potential entrant out of the market, and this clearly benefits the MNE.
The main trade-offs in the model are described in Section 1.2, while profits from the
different entry modes without spillovers are calculated in Section 1.3 and the resulting mode
of entry choice follows in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 contains the mode of entry discussion
with spillovers in the upstream market and Section 1.6 briefly concludes.
2Lin and Saggi (2006) also construct a model where the focus is on different types of contractual
relationships between a multinational and its local suppliers. They take the outsourcing decision as given,
and analyze the choice between anonymous market interaction between the downstream multinational
and its local suppliers, or contracts that do or do not constrain the supplier to only sell inputs to the
multinational (exclusivity or non-exclusivity contracts). In their setting there are no spillovers.
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1.2 Trade-offs between different modes of entry
Our firm enters the new market by establishing an assembly plant for its downstream,
monopoly product. The inverse market demand function is
p =
√
A/y, (1.1)
where A is a measure of market size and y is the amount of final goods sold in the market.
Production of the final good requires one unit of intermediate input per unit of final output,
otherwise the assembly process is costless. Since all organizational choices considered here
involve the establishment of the same assembly plant, we can ignore the fixed costs of
assembly. The intermediate input needed is specific for the final good and the firm controls
the technology for both stages of production. The MNE has three different ways of getting
intermediate inputs to its new plant: 1) import the intermediate inputs from the home
plant, 2) vertically integrated production of the intermediate, and 3) outsourcing of the
intermediate input to a local supplier.3
Imports are subject to iceberg trade costs: when importing x units of the intermediate
input at a unit price normalized to 1, only τI x units arrive to be used in the assembly
of the downstream product, τI ∈ (0, 1). When τI is close to one, trade costs are very
low, while as τI approaches zero, trade costs become prohibitive (subscript I denotes the
importing mode of entry).4
The two other ways of getting intermediate inputs are either by vertically integrated
production in the new plant (V) or by outsourcing of intermediate input production to a
local firm (O). Both require technology transfer from the home base of the MNE. Technol-
ogy transfer should be thought of mainly as transfer of the knowledge needed to produce
the specific intermediate, and as training costs to reduce the unit cost of production. Tech-
nology transfer costs are assumed to be convex, thus to transfer the amount of technology
3I consider only the mode of entry choice for the upstream production stage and assume that the MNE
locates the downstream stage in the new market. In previous versions I also included a fourth mode of
entry; exports of the final good from the home plant. Introducing this additional mode of entry has no
effect on how the possibility of upstream spillovers affect the mode of entry choice. Thus, in order to
simplify the model, the possibility of exporting the final good is ignored.
4An alternative interpretation of this organizational choice is that instead of importing the intermediate
from its home plant, the MNE purchases a generic input from the spot market (Spencer 2005). Since the
generic input is not customized for the downstream product of the MNE, the production process for the
final good is less efficient when using a generic input than when using a specialized input. When using x
units of the generic input the MNE can only produce τI x units of the final good.
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T , transfer costs are T 2, and this results in unit costs of intermediate input production of
1/T .
As in Grossman and Helpman (2002), intermediate input production for a given level
of technology transfer is less costly for the specialized supplier than for the vertically
integrated firm. This could be due to benefits of specialization for the outsourcing partner,
or extra monitoring costs in the vertically integrated firm. To capture this cost difference,
for a given level of technology transfer T, the outsourcing partner has unit cost 1/T while
the subsidiary of the MNE has unit cost 1/ (TτV ), where τV ∈ (0, 1) represents the cost
disadvantage of vertical integration (τV = 1 implies no cost disadvantage). An alternative
argument for a cost disadvantage of internal production of the intermediate input can be
based on a wage premium being paid by the MNE, as in Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and
Saggi (2002). The model here simplifies the production process for the final good since the
focus of the paper is the upstream market, but this does not preclude the possibility that
the assembly process can be both costly and complex. Imagine that the main advantage
of the multinational (and thus the main reason for its multinationality) stems from a
technological advantage in the assembly process; for instance through a superior ability
to manage a complex process of turning intermediates into the final product. In the
case of internal intermediate input production, the workers producing the intermediate in
question may also acquire some of the knowledge that gives the MNE its advantage in
the downstream market. Thus, in order to avoid labour mobility that might give rise to
diffusion of what the MNE considers as its essential technological advantage, it pays higher
wages to its workers; also to those producing the intermediate input focused on here.5
The extra cost of vertically integrated production of intermediates must be compared
to the efficiency problems generated by the two types of outsourcing contracts considered
here; incomplete contracts and successive monopoly. The basic justification for incomplete
contracts is that the quality of intermediate inputs, though observable by the parties to the
contract, cannot be verified by a third party. Nonverifiable quality implies non-contractible
quality, which again implies that an ex-ante contract specifying a price and a quantity
of the input is impossible. The MNE will not sign such a contract, since it gives the
supplier incentives to cut costs by reducing quality. Thus, the quality must be approved
by the downstream firm before any exchange can take place. One possible response to the
incomplete contracting environment is that the MNE and the supplier resort to bargaining
5A second alternative argument for an inefficiency of internal production of intermediates is to assume
incomplete contracts also within the firm as in Baker et al. (2002) and Antràs and Helpman (2004).
24 Multinationals’ mode of entry with presence of upstream spillovers
over how to share the sales revenue from the final good after the intermediates are produced
(Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Ottaviano and Turrini, 2003). Since the MNE will not
accept low quality intermediates at this stage, the supplier will produce the right quality.
With no alternative buyer of the intermediates, the supplier faces a potential hold-up
from the final good producer. The result is that the supplier has insufficient incentives to
produce the optimal quantity of intermediates. As the MNE expects suboptimal production
of intermediates, its incentives for technology transfer are also reduced, resulting in a
double hold-up problem. But, whereas the supplier has no alternative buyer and thus
has no outside option in the negotiations, the MNE can import intermediate inputs to its
subsidiary from the home plant.
The second type of contract considered here is the successive monopoly setting used
in Pack and Saggi (2001). In this case the MNE renounces on its bargaining power and
lets the supplier act as a monopolist when setting the price of the intermediates. Since the
demand for intermediates is derived from the demand in the downstream market where
the MNE is a monopolist, the successive monopoly setting gives rise to the well-known
double marginalization problem. Thus, both types of outsourcing contracts suffer from
inefficiency problems. The organizational choice of the MNE must balance the results
of imperfect contracting against the costs of less specialized internal production, and the
trade costs of importing the intermediate inputs.
1.3 Profits under different modes of entry
1.3.1 Imports of intermediate inputs
The MNE decides the amount of inputs to ship to its new plant. Due to transport costs,
when importing x units of input at a unit price normalized to 1, only τIx units of the
input arrive at the assembly plant and can be transformed into the final good. The profit
maximization problem is
max
x
ΠI = pτIx− x, (1.2)
where p is given by equation (1.1). The result is that the MNE imports x = 1
4
AτI units
of the intermediate, and gets a total profit of
ΠI =
1
4
AτI . (1.3)
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1.3.2 Vertical integration
After establishing the assembly plant, the MNE must decide on the level of technology
transfer for intermediate input production. Given the level of technology, the MNE makes
its production decision. The maximization problem is solved by backwards induction.
First, for a given technology level TV , maximize profits with respect to quantity produced:
Max
y
ΠV = py − 1
τV TV
y − T 2V . (1.4)
The resulting quantity is y = 1
4
AT 2Hτ
2
H , and depends on the technology level and the cost
disadvantage of internal production.
Second, find the optimal level of technology transfer by solving
Max
TV
ΠV = py − 1
τV TV
y − T 2V , (1.5)
taking y as given. The resulting level of technology transfer is TV = 18AτV , thus technol-
ogy transfer under vertical integration increases when internal production becomes more
efficient (τV increases). Total profit is
ΠV =
1
64
A2τ 2V . (1.6)
1.3.3 Outsourcing
After establishing the assembly plant, the MNE transfers technology to a local supplier, and
conducts only the assembly of the final good in its subsidiary. The profit from outsourcing
depends on the assumptions we make about the outsourcing relationship.
Incomplete contracts
If the outsourcing contract is incomplete, the two firms bargain over how to share the
surplus from exchange of the intermediate inputs after technology transfer and intermediate
input production have taken place. The surplus they can share is the revenue generated
from sale of the final good. Given the market demand in (1.1), surplus is
S =
√
Ay. (1.7)
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At the time of bargaining the supplier has no alternative buyer if the two firms cannot
agree, thus its fall-back in the negotiation is zero. The MNE can import intermediates from
its home plant, so its fall-back corresponds to the profit from importing inputs in equation
(1.3); 1
4
AτI . The Nash bargaining solution to the negotiation is (with equal bargaining
weights)
SS =
1
2
(S − 1
4
AτI) (1.8)
SMNE =
1
2
(S +
1
4
AτI), (1.9)
where SS is the supplier’s share of the surplus.
Anticipating the bargaining outcome, the supplier decides the quantity of inputs to
produce given the technology transfer it has received from the MNE:
Max
x
ΠS =
1
2
(
√
Ax− 1
4
AτI)− 1
TO
x. (1.10)
The resulting intermediate input production is
x =
1
16
AT 2O. (1.11)
Moving backwards to the first stage in the sequence of decisions, the decision problem
of the MNE is how much technology to transfer to its outsourcing partner, given what it
expects the supplier to produce (1.11), and how they will share the resulting surplus (1.9):
Max
TO
ΠMNEO =
1
2
(
√
Ax+
1
4
AτI)− T 2O. (1.12)
The profit maximizing level of technology transfer is
TO =
1
16
A, (1.13)
and the resulting profit levels are
ΠMNEO =
1
256
A2 +
1
8
AτI (1.14)
ΠS =
1
256
A2 − 1
8
AτI . (1.15)
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Successive monopoly
Following Pack and Saggi (2001), suppose that the MNE gives the supplier the right to sell
the intermediate inputs as a monopolist. The supplier sets the price of intermediates, given
the expected demand from the MNE. Using backwards induction we first find the MNE’s
demand for inputs when it takes the input price (pI) as given. The MNE’s maximization
problem results in the following input demand
x =
1
4
A
p2I
. (1.16)
Given the demand in (1.16) the supplier sets the price pI = 2T . Moving forwards to the
technology transfer decision of the MNE, the optimal level of transfer is T = 1
16
A which is
the same as under outsourcing, while the profit levels are
ΠMNE =
1
256
A2 (1.17)
ΠS =
1
256
A2. (1.18)
Comparing equations (1.17) and (1.14) we see that the MNE has lower profit with suc-
cessive monopoly than with incomplete contracts, while the supplier is better off when it
can set the intermediate input price as a monopolist (compare equations 1.18 and 1.15).
While the incomplete outsourcing contract generates a double hold-up problem, outsourc-
ing under successive monopoly suffers from the so-called double mark-up problem. Since
the total profits with the two outsourcing contracts are equal, the double hold-up and the
double mark-up generate the same degree of inefficiency with our choice of demand and
cost functions.
1.4 Mode of entry choice without spillovers
The MNE makes its organizational choice by comparing profit levels from different modes
of entry. This choice is affected by the value of the following parameters: market size
(A), input trade costs (τI), and the cost disadvantage of internal production (τV ). In
the following, we will see how mode of entry varies with market size and costs of trading
intermediate inputs, for a given value of the internal cost disadvantage, τV . This is done
by calculating iso-profit curves and combining them in figures with market size (A) on the
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vertical axis and input trade costs (τI) on the horizontal axis.
1.4.1 Mode of entry with incomplete outsourcing contracts
The iso-profit curves are found by pairwise comparing profit levels from each mode of entry
in equations (1.3), (1.6), and (1.14). Comparing (1.14) and (1.3), we find that outsourcing
is preferred to importing inputs when
A > 32τI . (1.19)
From (1.14) and (1.6), we find that vertical integration is preferred to outsourcing when
A > 8
τI
τ 2V − 14
, (1.20)
as long as the internal cost disadvantage is not too large (τV > 12). If τV <
1
2
outsourcing
dominates vertical integration for all market sizes and input trade costs. For a given
value of the internal cost disadvantage, both equations (1.19) and (1.20) are straight lines
from the origin. Combining the two equations we see that both outsourcing and vertical
integration are possible choices for the MNE only if the iso-profit curve in (1.20) has a
steeper slope than the iso-profit curve in (1.19):
8
τI
τ 2V − 14
> 32τI . (1.21)
The resulting constraint on τV is τV ∈ (12 , 12
√
2). If τV < 12 outsourcing dominates
vertical integration for all market sizes and input trade costs, because the internal cost
disadvantage is too large to make vertical integration attractive for the MNE. If τV > 12
√
2
vertical integration dominates outsourcing because the efficiency loss generated by the
internal cost disadvantage is smaller than the efficiency loss generated by the hold-up
problem under incomplete contracts.
It is also important to check whether the supplier would want to produce for the MNE
under the conditions of the incomplete outsourcing contract. We assume that the supplier
declines an outsourcing contract if it expects negative profits. From equation (1.15) we
find that the supplier accepts whenever the MNE prefers outsourcing to vertical FDI; i.e.
when equation (1.19) holds.
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Figure 1.1: Mode of entry with incomplete outsourcing contracts
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The third iso-profit curve is derived from equations (1.3) and (1.6), and we find that
vertical integration is preferred to imports of intermediates when
A > 16
τI
τ 2V
. (1.22)
The initial choice of τV is made such that all three modes of entry are chosen in different
areas of the (A − τI) -plane when outsourcing contracts are incomplete (τV = 0.55). The
relevant iso-profit curves are drawn in the (A− τI)-plane. In Figure 1.1, and all following
figures, the iso-profit curves are named with two letters corresponding to the two modes of
entry being compared. As an example, the VO-curve shows the combinations of market size
and input trade costs that equate profit from outsourcing to profit from vertical integration.
The first letter corresponds to the mode of entry that is preferred above the curve.
The MNE’s mode of entry choice when outsourcing contracts are incomplete is shown
in Figure 1.1. From the figure we see that the MNE prefers to import intermediates when
the market is too small to sustain the costs of technology transfer and trade costs are low.
As market size increases the expected sales will be large enough to sustain also the costs
of technology transfer, and outsourcing will be the preferred mode of entry. The reason
for outsourcing to be preferred to vertical integration in the area of the figure where input
trade costs are low is simply that low input trade costs give the MNE a better fall-back in
the outsourcing negotiations with the supplier, and thus a large share of the surplus from
the outsourcing relationship. When input trade costs are high (close to the vertical axis
of the figure) the MNE’s fall-back in the negotiations with the supplier is so low that it
prefers vertical integration to outsourcing. The iso-profit curve in (1.22) is not drawn in
the figure since it is dominated by the other two iso-profit curves.
1.4.2 Mode of entry with successive monopoly
The iso-profit curves for outsourcing under successive monopoly versus the other modes of
entry are now found by comparing equation (1.17) with equations (1.3) and (1.6). From
(1.6) and (1.17) we find that the MNE has higher profit from vertical integration than
from outsourcing as long as τV > 12 . So with our choice of parameter values (τV = 0.55),
the MNE will never choose outsourcing if the supplier can set the price of intermediate
inputs. This means that the only relevant iso-profit curve is the curve comparing profits
from vertical integration and imports of intermediates (1.22). This is shown in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: Mode of entry with successive monopoly
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1.5 Mode of entry choice with upstream spillovers
Consider what happens if spillovers from local production of the intermediate input in the
new market generate threat of entry by a new intermediate input producer. This could
happen under both vertical integration and outsourcing. First, consider the case where
the MNE initially had chosen vertical integration and produces the intermediate inputs in-
house. During the manufacturing of the inputs, knowledge of how to make the specialized
input spreads to a potential new supplier. But at this point the costs of producing the
intermediates are already sunk, and thus the MNE is not able to benefit from the upstream
spillovers. Therefore we only need to consider the effect of spillovers in the upstream market
under outsourcing.
1.5.1 Outsourcing with incomplete contracts
If the knowledge of how to produce the intermediates needed by the MNE spreads to
another local firm, the MNE can turn to the new supplier if the negotiation with the
incumbent breaks down. A potential new supplier improves the MNE’s fall-back in its
negotiation with the incumbent supplier. The new supplier has a unit cost of 1/γTO where
γ ∈ (0, 1) is the spillover parameter and TO is the level of training and technology transfer
that the incumbent supplier has received. With perfect spillovers (γ = 1) the potential
entrant has the same unit cost as the incumbent supplier.
To find the new fall-back in the negotiation with the incumbent, we must consider
what would happen if the MNE were to break with the incumbent and rather bargain with
the entrant. The entrant would have zero fall-back (no alternative buyer of inputs) while
the MNE’s fall-back would still be to import the inputs. Since the negotiation with the
entrant has the same structure as the negotiation with the incumbent when no spillovers
occur (Section 1.3.3), the new supplier faces the same trade-off as the incumbent supplier
did. Thus the entrant will produce xE = 1
16
AT 2o γ
2 units of the input, and the sales
revenue or surplus that could be generated from interaction with the potential entrant is
SE = 1
4
γATO. The resulting share for the MNE will be given by (1.9) with SE replacing
S. This potential share from bargaining with the entrant now defines the fall-back for the
MNE when bargaining with the incumbent supplier:
FMNE =
1
8
γATo +
1
8
AτI . (1.23)
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The incumbent supplier faces the same tradeoff as without threat of entry of a new
supplier, and will produce the same as without spillovers, given in equation (1.11), for a
given level of technology transfer from the MNE.
Since the technology transfer decision affects the unit cost of both the incumbent and
the new supplier, the MNE faces a new tradeoff when making its technology transfer
decision. The MNE decides on how much technology to transfer given its knowledge about
what the outsourcing supplier will produce and how technology transfer affects its fall-back
through spillovers. The profit maximization problem of the MNE is
Max
TO
ΠMNEO =
1
2
(S + FMNE)− T 2O, (1.24)
with first order condition
1
2
(
∂S
∂TO
+
∂FMNE
∂TO
) = 2TO. (1.25)
Use equations (1.7), (1.23) in the first order condition to solve for the optimal level of
technology transfer:
TO =
1
32
A(2 + γ). (1.26)
Comparing equations (1.13) and (1.26) we see that technology transfer is higher with
spillovers than without. The reason is that transferring better technology to the outsourc-
ing partner also lowers the unit cost in the firm that benefits from spillovers. A lower
unit cost for the potential entrant improves the MNE’s fall-back in its negotiation with
the incumbent, and gives the MNE a larger share of the surplus. The profit levels with
spillovers are
ΠMNEO =
(
1
32
A(2 + γ)
)2
+
1
16
AτI (1.27)
ΠS =
1
16
(
1
32
A2(2 + γ) (1− γ)− AτI
)
(1.28)
Equations (1.27) and (1.28) only apply if the threat of entry of a new supplier is credible.
If not, the MNE is unable to use the threat of going to a new supplier in its negotiations
with the incumbent, and we are back to the situation without spillovers where the relevant
profit levels are given in equations (1.14) and (1.15).
The first condition for credible entry is of course that the entrant expects positive
profits if it contracts with the MNE. The entrant’s profit is ΠE = 1
8
γATO− 18AτI − 1γTOxE,
where the level of technology transfer is given in equation (1.26) and xE = 1
16
AT 2Oγ
2. The
34 Multinationals’ mode of entry with presence of upstream spillovers
resulting participation constraint for the entrant is
A ≥ 32
γ
τI
1
2
γ + 1
. (1.29)
The second condition is that the MNE would actually prefer an outsourcing contract
with the entrant to the other modes of entry if it breaks with the incumbent. The profit
the MNE would get if it bargained with the entrant is
ΠMNEOE =
1
8
γATO +
1
8
AτI − (TO)2 . (1.30)
The MNE’s threat of going to the new supplier is only credible if the iso-profit curves
for outsourcing with the entrant (1.30) versus imports of intermediates (1.3), and vertical
integration (1.6), give rise to an area in A− τI -space where outsourcing with the entrant
would be chosen. If spillovers are perfect (γ = 1), these isoprofit curves give the outsourcing
area illustrated in Figure 1.3. The entrant’s participation constraint in (1.29) is not binding
in this area and is therefore not drawn in the figure. It is only within the outsourcing area
in Figure 1.3 that the profit levels in equations (1.27) and (1.28) are relevant. Outside this
area, both the MNE and the incumbent supplier know that the MNE is unable to use the
threat of entry in the negotiations with the incumbent. The result is that the decisions of,
and the result for, the MNE would be the same as if no spillovers are expected.
The two iso-profit curves that are drawn in Figure 1.3 correspond to the two iso-profit
curves that delimit the outsourcing area in Figure 1.1. The difference is that in Figure
1.3 the MNE’s outsourcing profits come from bargaining with the entrant, while in Figure
1.1 the MNE bargains with the incumbent that received technology transfer. Since Figure
1.3 is drawn for perfect spillovers, it seems surprising that the outsourcing area is smaller
than in the corresponding Figure 1.1 without spillovers.6 The reason is simply that the
expectations of spillovers and consequent potential entry have induced the MNE to transfer
more technology in order to improve its bargaining position against the incumbent supplier.
These extra transfer costs are larger than the extra surplus that could be shared due to
the entrant’s incentives to produce more with better technology.
The outsourcing area in Figure 1.3 is reduced as spillovers decrease (the slope of the
VO–entrant curve decreases while the slope of the OI-entrant curve increases), and when
6Note that the other iso-profit curves are left out of Figure 1.3 in order to focus on the area where the
threat of entry is credible. All iso-profit curves relevant for this case are repeated in Figure 1.4.
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Figure 1.3: When is threat of entry credible?
γ ≈ 0.94, the MNE’s threat of bargaining with the new supplier is never credible because
the MNE would choose vertical integration rather than an outsourcing contract with the
entrant.7
Even if spillovers are large enough for the threat of entry to be credible, from the profit
expression for the incumbent supplier (1.28) we get the participation constraint
A ≥ 32 τI
(2 + γ) (1− γ) . (1.31)
If the supplier expects perfect spillovers, we clearly see that the incomplete outsourcing
contract will be rejected. In general, it will be the case that the incumbent supplier will
not accept an outsourcing contract if it expects spillovers to be large enough to make the
threat of entry of a new supplier credible. Thus the conclusion is that when the threat
7In equation (1.29) it is assumed that there are no entry costs for the firm that benefits from spillovers.
With such entry costs, the entrant’s participation constraint will be tighter and the area where the threat
of entry is credible will be smaller or completely disappear, even with perfect spillovers.
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of entry is credible, the MNE is unable to find a supplier that will accept an incomplete
outsourcing contract. The result is that the MNE is worse off compared to a situation
without spillovers because it cannot find an outsourcing partner that is willing to accept
the contract unless the MNE can commit itself not to exploit the increased competition
generated by spillovers.
Figure 1.4 shows the mode of entry picture if spillovers are perfect. The figure is a
combination of Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.3. Within the area in Figure 1.3 where the threat of
bargaining with the new supplier is credible, the incumbent supplier rejects the incomplete
outsourcing contract and the MNE’s mode of entry is either imports of intermediates (I)
or vertical integration (V ).
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Figure 1.4: Mode of entry with incomplete contracts and spillovers
1.5.2 Outsourcing with successive monopoly
If the MNE gives the local supplier the power to set the price of the intermediate inputs, the
effects of upstream spillovers and threat of upstream entry are very different from the case
with incomplete outsourcing contracts. As in Pack and Saggi (2001), I assume Bertrand
competition, i.e. the incumbent supplier reduces the price it charges for the input in order
to keep the potential entrant out of the market. When the potential entrant has unit cost
1
γT
, threat of entry is only credible if the unit cost is lower than the price the incumbent
charges without spillovers, ie: 1
γT
< 2
T
⇔ γ > 1
2
. With threat of entry, the incumbent sets
its price to 1
γT
. Expecting this lower price, the MNE has incentives for a larger technology
transfer T = 1
8
γA, and the resulting profit levels of the MNE and the supplier are
ΠMNE =
1
64
A2γ2 (1.32)
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ΠS =
1
32
A2γ2(1− γ). (1.33)
Figure 1.5: Mode of entry with successive monopoly and spillovers
As long as entry is credible, the MNE is better off and the supplier worse off than
without spillovers. It is also the case that the profit of the MNE in (1.32) is larger than
outsourcing profits with incomplete contracts (1.14). Comparing profits from outsourcing
(1.32) with profits from vertical integration (1.6) we see that outsourcing is preferred as
long as γ > τI . Thus the mode of entry picture for the MNE changes completely with
spillovers. Comparing Figure 1.5 with the corresponding Figure 1.2 for the case without
spillovers, we see that the MNE prefers outsourcing if it expects spillovers from the supplier
to other firms, while if it does not expect such spillovers, it prefers vertical integration.
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1.6 Conclusions
When multinationals consider how to enter a foreign market, their decision might be af-
fected by how their technology may spill over to other firms under different modes of entry.
The mode of entry trade-off has typically been considered in models of horizontal FDI
where competitors (new or existing) of the MNE acquire the knowledge of how to produce
the MNE’s product. The possibility of such ex-post competition may induce the MNE
to export its product, rather than to establish a subsidiary in the foreign market. This
chapter departs from the horizontal spillover-assumption and considers how mode of entry
is affected by spillovers of intermediate input technology.
In the model presented here the MNE chooses between three different modes of entry.
Two of the entry-modes involve production of the intermediate inputs in the local market,
either by in-house production (vertical integration) or outsourcing. With local production
of intermediate inputs, spillovers may enable a new firm to produce the inputs required
by the MNE. Intuitively, this should be beneficial for the MNE. The results presented
here show that upstream spillovers may not benefit the MNE in a setting of incomplete
outsourcing contracts, while they are clearly beneficial in a successive monopoly setting.
Since both the supplier and the MNE make relation-specific investments (specialized
input production and technology transfer, respectively), outsourcing with incomplete con-
tracts suffers from a double hold-up problem. Threat of upstream entry works as an
improvement of the bargaining position of the MNE in the outsourcing negotiations with
the incumbent supplier. If knowledge of how to produce the input spreads to another
firm, the MNE can threaten the incumbent supplier with getting inputs from the potential
entrant, and thus get a larger share in the negotiations with the incumbent. Unfortunately
for the MNE, this threat is not credible in most cases.
In addition, it turns out that when the threat of going to the entrant would be credible,
the MNE is unable to outsource in the first place because a potential outsourcing partner
expects negative profits with spillovers. Unless the MNE can commit itself not to exploit an
increase in competition upstream, potential outsourcing partners will decline an incomplete
outsourcing contract.
Upstream spillovers are much more beneficial for the MNE if the outsourcing relation-
ship is a successive monopoly where the supplier sets the price of the inputs. A threat of
entry of a new supplier forces the incumbent supplier to reduce its price in order to keep
the competitor out of the market, and this benefits the downstream MNE. The effect on
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the mode of entry choice is that the MNE increases its outsourcing activities if it expects
spillovers, while with incomplete outsourcing contracts, spillovers have no, or possibly a
negative, effect on the extent of outsourcing.
In cases where for instance the quality of the intermediate input is observable for the
MNE, but not easily verifiable by a third party, an incomplete contracting framework is
thought to be relevant (Grossmann and Helpman, 2002). An empirical implication of
the model is that in such cases multinationals may, after having transferred technology
to an outsourcing partner, choose to let the supplier set the price of inputs, instead of
bargaining over how to share the surplus. This choice of contract will be preferred for
input technologies where spillovers are expected to occur, while if the MNE expects no or
insignificant spillovers, incomplete outsourcing contracts are more likely to prevail.
An interesting topic for further analysis is to investigate how the interaction of upstream
and downstream spillovers affects the choice of outsourcing when contracts are incomplete.
Chapter 2
Foreign firms and host-country productivity:
Does the mode of entry matter?
- joint with Stefanie A. Haller∗
Abstract
Foreign direct investment is often considered an important source of knowledge
spillovers. However, results from the empirical literature relating overall foreign
presence to host country productivity are ambiguous. We argue that this may
be because different modes of entry may have different effects on productivity.
Using 24 years of comprehensive panel data for Norwegian Manufacturing, we
find that greenfield entry has a negative impact on the productivity growth of
domestic plants, while entry via acquisition affects local productivity positively.
The net effect is a small positive effect of an overall change in foreign presence
on local productivity growth.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for valuable comments from and discussions with Carlo Altomonte, Davide
Castellani, Chiara Criscuolo, Holger Görg, Lisa Lynch, Jarle Møen, Øivind Anti Nilsen, Kjell
Gunnar Salvanes, Fabio Schiantarelli and seminar participants at the Nordic International
Trade Seminars in Helsinki, 2005.
∗Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin
42 Foreign firms and host-country productivity: Does the mode of entry matter?
2.1 Introduction
A large empirical literature has examined whether foreign presence in an industry gives
rise to productivity spillovers to local firms in the same industry. A recent survey by Görg
and Greenaway (2004) suggests that the literature on so-called intra-industry spillovers
has not come up with a clear-cut answer.1 A reason put forward is that multinational
enterprises (MNEs), in addition to being potential sources of knowledge spillovers, are
potential sources of competition. It is argued that in the short run at least, foreign firms
are likely to steal market shares from domestic firms and, thereby, force them up their
average cost curves. This implies that the measured productivity of domestic firms will be
lower and we will observe a negative effect from foreign entry (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
A positive effect of foreign presence on host country firms is usually interpreted as evidence
of knowledge diffusion or technology transfer, though competition could also be at work
when a positive spillover effect is observed. Entry of new and efficient firms that increase
product market competition, may enhance productivity in domestic firms by forcing them
to reduce x-inefficiencies or to adopt new technologies faster than they otherwise would.
Bartelsman et al. (2004) provide evidence of this Schumpeterian argument for a number of
developed and developing countries; they find a positive correlation between turnover rates
and productivity growth of incumbents. More directly, Aghion et al. (2005) demonstrate
that foreign entry in the UK increases the incentives of firms to innovate in order to survive
the increased competition. Of course, such a positive impact of foreign competition on host
country firms may take time to materialise, see Sembenelli and Siotis (2005) for evidence
from Spain.
Traditionally, the spillover-literature has measured foreign presence as the share of
industry employment in foreign-owned firms, which represents the accumulated foreign
direct investments (FDI) in the sector. This measure combines new foreign entrants with
foreign-owned firms that have been in the market for some time. We argue that a change
in competitive pressure due to foreign presence should primarily come from new foreign
entrants, and not from foreign-owned firms that have already established their position in a
sector. In turn, if knowledge externalities take time to materialise, spillovers are more likely
to originate from foreign firms that have been in the market for a while. Our argument
1Among more recent studies, Aitken and Harrison (1999) find a negative effect for Venezuela, as does
Konings (2001) for Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, and Djankov and Hoeckman (2000) for the Czech
republic. On the other hand Haskel et al. (2002) and Keller and Yeaple (2003) find evidence of positive
spillovers for the UK and the US, respectively.
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implies that the estimated effects of overall foreign presence on domestic productivity
could conceal very different effects from new foreign entrants and existing foreign firms.
To investigate this, we decompose the usual measure of foreign presence into one term
representing the existing foreign-owned firms in a sector and another term representing
the new foreign entrants. Once we focus explicitly on the recent foreign entrants, we are
also able to take account of the fact that foreign ownership can come about either by
greenfield entry or by foreign acquisition of assets in existing domestic firms.
There are several reasons to suggest that the competition effect of foreign entry and
the potential for spillovers from foreign entry may differ according to the mode of entry.
We address differences in the potential for spillovers first. On the one hand, domestic firms
acquired by foreign owners are likely to be more integrated in the host country economy
than greenfield entrants; hence, the existing linkages with other local firms may serve as a
channel for spillovers. On the other hand, if the most efficient foreign investors are more
likely to choose greenfield entry2, the new knowledge stock that forms the basis for poten-
tial spillovers may be larger with greenfield entry than with foreign acquisitions. Regarding
possible competition effects, the likely differences between greenfield and acquisition en-
try derive from the way these two alternatives affect industry market structure.3 While
greenfield entry increases production capacity and therefore also competition, acquisitions
do not necessarily have an immediate impact on market structure. Moreover, competi-
tion or efficiency-enhancing effects may take longer to materialise if an acquisition involves
substantial restructuring in the acquired plant.
Our aim in this chapter is to investigate whether the mode of foreign entry matters for
the effects FDI has on host country firms. The approach is in the spirit of the spillover
literature, where there have not been studies distinguishing between the recent foreign
entrants and the existing foreign firms or between different modes of entry. There have,
however, been previous efforts to refine the spillover question by splitting FDI into different
subgroups. One example is studies examining whether the degree of ownership matters for
the extent of spillovers from FDI (e.g. Blomström and Sjöholm (1999), Dimelis and Louri
(2002) and Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu (2003)). Another example are efforts to
distinguish between technology sourcing and technology exploitation as motives for FDI
(Driffield and Love (2002), Driffield et al. (2005)).4 And finally, Castellani and Zanfei
2See Smarzynska-Javorcik and Saggi (2004) for a theoretical argument and empirical evidence.
3See e.g. UNCTAD (2000, p.145) for an informal description and Haller (2005) for a more formal
exposition.
4The argument that the motivation for FDI may matter for spillovers goes back to Fosfuri and Motta
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(2005) look into the importance of firm heterogeneity in terms of the markets they serve
for generating and absorbing spillovers.
We use a large panel data set of Norwegian manufacturing industries for the period
1978-2001. Our results from estimating an augmented production function suggest that a
change in foreign presence measured as the change in the share of overall employment in
foreign-owned plants relative to total employment in a sector, has a significant but small
positive effect on the productivity growth of domestic firms in low-concentration sectors.
When we specifically account for the change in foreign presence due to both greenfield entry
and foreign acquisitions, we find opposite effects of the two modes of entry. The impact
of greenfield entry on domestic productivity growth is negative and seems to be caused
by domestic plants not adjusting their use of inputs (in particular labour) when reducing
their output due to market share losses. Thus, greenfield entry can be associated with a
negative competition effect. In contrast, we find a positive and significant effect of foreign
acquisitions in low-concentration sectors. This suggests that existing linkages between the
acquired plant and other domestic plants may facilitate knowledge spillovers. There seems
to be no effect of recent foreign entry on the productivity growth of domestic plants in
high-concentration sectors. Our results are robust to a number of different specifications.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss our
strategy for estimating the impact from greenfield entry and entry by acquisition on the
productivity of domestic firms. In Section 2.3 we describe the data sources and give an
overview of the development of foreign ownership and foreign entry in Norwegian manu-
facturing. We present our results in Section 2.4, and examine their robustness in Section
2.5. Section 2.6 briefly concludes.
2.2 Empirical specification
In order to examine the impact of foreign presence and different modes of foreign entry on
the productivity of domestic firms, we use an approach commonly adopted in the spillover
(1999), who demonstrate in a theoretical model that MNEs without firm specific advantages may have
technology sourcing motives for FDI. If technology sourcing is the motive for FDI, one should not expect
spillovers.
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literature and start with an augmented production function of the following form
lnYit = βK lnKit + βM lnMit + βH lnHit (2.1)
+
T∑
k=0
βkFPI,t−k + γZit + υi + υt + εit.
In equation (2.1) lnY , lnK, lnM , and lnH are the natural logs of output, capital, hours
and materials in plant i, year t.5 FPI,t−k captures foreign presence at the 5-digit industry
level and Z includes a set of competition variables. υi and υt are plant and time specific
effects.
We employ a set of variables similar to those first proposed by Nickell (1996) to control
for competition. These include industry concentration (CR5It), market share (MSit), profit
margin (PMit) and a measure of openness (OPENIt). As our concentration measure we
use the sum of market shares of the five largest plants defined at the 5-digit industry level.6
Technological differences across industries imply very different requirements in terms of size
and scale for firms to be able to operate in their respective environments, see Sutton (1996).
High market shares, therefore, need not indicate a lack of competition. However, as argued
by Nickell (1996), changes in market structure over time are still going to be reasonably
good measures of changes in competition. The profit margin measure (PMit) is thought
to capture possible rents that may be available to shareholders and workers in the form
of higher pay and lower effort. The expected signs on the concentration measure, market
share and profit margin are negative: higher profit margins allow scope for lower effort and
thus lower productivity, and higher market shares or concentration ratios are associated
with lower effort and productivity levels. As higher efficiency would raise both profit
margins and market shares, these variables are potentially endogenous, which could result
in positive coefficients. We follow Haskel et al. (2002) and Disney et al. (2003) and address
this problem by lagging both measures. We use one-period lags and note that endogeneity
gives rise to an upward bias in the estimated coefficients. The variable OPENIt is defined
as imports over the sum of exports and imports, and the idea is that increased import
competition acts as a disciplining force that has a positive effect on productivity.7
5The definitions of input and output rely to a large extent on previous work with this data, e.g. Griliches
and Ringstad (1971), Simpson (1994), Møen (1998) and Klette (1999). For the construction of all variables,
see the variable definitions in the Appendix.
6We have 132 5-digit sectors in our estimations.
7Due to data limitations, OPENIt is defined at the 3-digit industry level. We also experimented with
the import penetration ratio (imports divided by domestic consumption) as an alternative measure, and
our results are not sensitive to which measure of import competition we use. We feel more comfortable
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Bartelsman et al. (2004) find a positive correlation between turnover rates and produc-
tivity growth of incumbents, which suggests that industries with a high turnover of firms
are characterised by higher productivity. Thus, as an additional control variable we use the
sum of entry and exit rates as a measure of gross turnover in the industry (TurnoverIt).
We also lag this variable by one period due to possible endogeneity. Turnover is also likely
to be a good measure of industry-specific business cycles since entry and exit are closely
correlated with the business cycle.
In equation (2.1), FPIt is the variable of main interest. In line with the previous
spillover literature, in our first specification we take the variable to represent the overall
stock of foreign presence measured as the share of industry employment in foreign-owned
plants at the 5-digit ISIC level:
FPIt =
∑
i∈FOIt
(Empl)it
(Total empl)It
, (2.2)
where FOIt is the set of all foreign-owned plants in sector I, year t. As the effects from
foreign presence may take time to materialise, we include 2 lags of foreign presence in our
estimations. We experimented with different lag structures; more than two lags were not
significant in any of our regressions.
To eliminate plant and industry specific effects we estimate equation (2.1) in first dif-
ferences8, thus our regression equation is
∆ lnYit = αK∆ lnKit + αM∆ lnMit + αH∆ lnHit (2.3)
+
2∑
k=0
βk1∆FPI,t−k + γ1∆MSi,t−1 + γ2∆PMi,t−1
+ γ3∆CR5I,t + γ4∆OPENI,t + γ5TurnoverI,t−1
+ υt + ξit.
using OPENIt as we do not need to combine different data sources for its construction.
8An alternative method to eliminate unobserved plant specific effects is to use fixed effects estimation
(within-transformation). The choice between these estimation strategies hinges on the properties of the
idiosyncratic error term in equation (2.1). Fixed effects is efficient if the idiosyncratic error terms are not
serially correlated, which implies that the within-transformed error terms should be negatively correlated.
The residuals (excluding the plant specific effect) from a fixed effects estimation of (2.1) exhibit positive
autocorrelation with an estimated ρ of 0.37. First differencing is efficient if the first-differenced error terms
are not serially correlated. In our case, the residuals from the first-differenced equation (2.3) exhibit weak
negative serial correlation with an estimated ρ of -0.17. These properties of the residuals support the
choice of using first differences as our method of eliminating plant specific effects.
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We estimate equation (2.3) on the sample of firms that are Norwegian owned throughout
their presence in our panel. In all our regressions, we include year dummies to control for
common year specific shocks to all manufacturing plants, and industry dummies (3-digit
level) to account for industry specific linear time trends in the levels of the dependent
variable.
∆FPIt represents the change in foreign presence in the industry from t − 1 to t given
as
∆FPIt =
∑
i∈FOIt
(Empl)it
(Total empl)It
−
∑
i∈FOI,t−1
(Empl)i,t−1
(Total empl)I,t−1
, (2.4)
where FOIt is the set of foreign-owned plants in industry I at time t. A change in foreign
presence can come about by greenfield entry of foreign plants, foreign acquisitions, em-
ployment expansion or contraction in existing foreign-owned firms, and also by withdrawal
of foreign-owned firms through divestures or plant closures. To the extent that the effect
of recent entrants is different from that of long established foreign-owned firms, empirical
studies of spillovers from FDI which use the overall foreign presence measure may generate
ambiguous results because the measure is a combination of these different causes of change
in foreign presence. In particular, when discussing the possible competition effects of FDI,
we argue that one should pay attention to the recent foreign entrants. Sembenelli and
Siotis (2005), in their analysis of the effect of FDI on the price cost margins of Spanish
firms, interpret the negative short-term effects of foreign presence as a competition effect
and longer-term positive effects as spillovers. As their measure of foreign presence captures
the stock of FDI in the sector, they are not able to explicitly identify the impact of the
recent foreign entrants. The same caveat applies to Aghion et al. (2004): in their study
of entry and productivity growth in the UK, they associate foreign entry with the first
difference of overall foreign presence.
Thus, in our second specification we proceed to isolate the impact of the recent for-
eign entrants on the productivity of domestic plants. Although the overall change in
foreign presence ∆FPIt could be caused by many factors, we focus here on greenfield and
acquisition entry, and group the remaining possible changes into one term. The set of
foreign-owned firms FOIt at time t can be split into the sets of greenfield entrants (GEIt),
acquisition entrants (AEIt), and the set of remaining foreign-owned plants that have been
present in the sector for at least one year (FO1It), thus FOIt = GEIt ∪ AEIt ∪ FO1It.
Using these definitions of the different groups of foreign plants in year t, we can rewrite
equation (2.4) in the following way
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∆FPIt =
∑
i∈GEIt
(Empl)it
(Total empl)It
+
∑
i∈AEIt
(Empl)it
(Total empl)It
(2.5)
+

∑
i∈FO1It
(Empl)it
(Total empl)It
−
∑
i∈FOI,t−1
(Empl)i,t−1
(Total empl)I,t−1

≡ GIt + AIt +∆FIt.
The first term GIt in equation (2.5) represents the change in foreign presence between t−1
and t that is attributable to greenfield entry. It is the employment-weighted greenfield entry
rate; i.e. the sum of employment in those plants in industry I that are greenfield entrants
in year t expressed as a share of total employment in the industry that year. Similarly, AIt
represents the change in foreign presence due to foreign acquisitions; i.e. the employment
share of plants in industry I that are acquired by foreign owners between t − 1 and t.
GIt and AIt represent the flow of new FDI into the sector differentiated by the mode of
entry. The last term ∆FIt equals the two terms in brackets, and represents the remaining
change in foreign presence between t − 1 and t. ∆FIt captures employment expansion or
contraction of existing foreign-owned firms relative to total industry employment, and also
withdrawal of foreign firms through divestures or plant closures.
As the variables of main interest are foreign presence and foreign entry, we should
take into account that the estimated relationship between these variables and productivity
could be biased by selection on survival. Suppose for example, that foreign greenfield
entry occurs primarily in sectors with good market growth prospects. In such sectors, even
low productivity firms may survive, creating a negative correlation between foreign entry
and productivity among surviving firms. Conversely, if foreign entry increases competitive
pressure such that only the best firms survive, there will be a positive correlation between
foreign entry and productivity among surviving firms. Thus, the selection bias could work
in both directions and the overall bias is not known. To address this potential problem we
use a Heckman selection model as one of our specifications when estimating equation (2.3)
with both (2.4) or (2.5) representing the change in foreign presence.
The effect of a change in foreign presence on productivity growth may depend on the
market structure of the industry. On the one hand, it could be argued that information
about new technologies may spread more easily in a small and transparent market. This
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would imply that spillovers may be larger in concentrated industries. On the other hand,
greenfield entry in a concentrated industry may have a larger impact on the competitive
pressure in the industry than greenfield entry in a less concentrated industry. At least in the
short run, this could lead to reduced domestic market shares or even a reduction in output
prices. A similar effect might be generated if a foreign acquisition in a concentrated industry
puts an end to collusive behaviour in that industry. To take account of the possibility that
the effect of foreign entry may depend on the market structure of an industry, one of our
specifications includes interaction terms and lagged interaction terms between the change-
in-foreign-presence variable(s) under consideration and the 5-firm concentration measure.
2.3 Data
Our main data source is the annual census of all Norwegian manufacturing plants col-
lected by Statistics Norway. The Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics are collected at the
plant level, where the plant is defined as a functional unit at a single physical location,
engaged mainly in activities within a specific activity group. The plant-level variables
include detailed information on production, input use, investment, location, and industry
classification. We use the ISIC Rev. 2 industry classification in our analysis.9
We drop plants with less than 8 employees throughout their lives, and observations
of plants not in ordinary production (service units or plants under construction).10 The
resulting sample contains 150,000 observations from 10,400 plants for the period 1978-2001,
with an average plant size of 43 employees. In terms of employment and output, the sample
contains more than 90% of total manufacturing output and employment.
Information about foreign ownership for the period 1990-2001 is obtained from the
SIFON-register, which is a record of foreign ownership of equity in Norwegian firms. The
SIFON-register contains information about the value and share of equity held by the largest
foreign owner of the firm, the total share of equity held by foreign owners and the coun-
try of origin of the largest owner.11 The register was initiated in 1972, and while only
9For more detailed descriptions of the Manufacturing Statistics, see the documentation in Halvorsen et
al. (1991) and Møen (2004).
10In addition, we drop plants that in the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics are classified as "small"
(defined as having less than 5 or 10 employees) throughout their life. The information for these plants comes
mainly from administrative registers and is therefore less extensive than for large plants. In particular,
there is no investment information, which means that we are unable to construct capital measures for this
group.
11See Simpson (1994) for more details about the SIFON-register.
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direct foreign ownership was recorded before 1990, from 1990 onwards also indirect foreign
ownership is documented.12 Before 1990, the Manufacturing Statistics contains a variable
where plants are classified into three ownership classes; plants that are part of firms where
less than 20%, between 20-50%, or more than 50% of the equity is directly foreign owned.
This information is obtained from earlier versions of the SIFON-register. We have chosen
to treat indirect and direct foreign ownership equally after 1990, which means that we
classify plants as foreign owned when either the direct or the indirect foreign ownership of
equity is above the 20% threshold.13
Figure 2.1: Foreign presence in Norwegian manufacturing
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It is likely that registration of indirect foreign ownership in 1990 was somewhat incom-
plete as this was the first year when this type of foreign ownership was recorded. It is
also likely that the degree of underreporting of indirect foreign ownership declined during
the early 1990s. Figure 2.1 illustrates the development of foreign ownership in our sam-
ple, and shows a dramatic increase in foreign presence during the 1990s. This increase
in foreign presence is a combination of a trend increase in foreign ownership as well as a
result of the extended definition and recording of foreign ownership. The rate of increase
12A firm has direct foreign ownership interests if foreigners own part of the equity of the firm. Firms
of which 50% or more is owned by another firm based in Norway (mother), and where the foreign equity
stakes are in the mother, are classified as indirectly foreign owned.
13We report how this affects our results in the robustness analysis in section 2.5.
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in the number of indirectly foreign-owned plants during the 1990s was higher than that of
directly foreign-owned plants, and by 2001 the number of indirectly foreign-owned plants
exceeded the number of plants with direct foreign ownership interests. Global trends in
corporate ownership structures may partly explain this shift towards indirect foreign own-
ership, but it is unlikely that indirect foreign ownership in Norwegian manufacturing was
nonexistent during the 1980s. Thus, our sample is likely to underestimate the extent of
foreign ownership before the early 1990s.
In the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics each plant is assigned an identification num-
ber which it keeps throughout its life. A plant will even keep its previous identification
number when it re-enters the panel after a time of inactivity as long as production restarts
in the same geographic location. Mergers or buy-outs at the firm level do not affect the
plant identification code. Since our data are from a census, we avoid the problem of possible
false entries and exits due to plants not being sampled.
Table 2.1: Annual number of foreign and domestic plants and foreign entrants
Domestic Foreign Greenfield Acquisition
plants plants entry entry
1980-84 6,914 225 5 24
1985-89 6,492 223 8 35
1990-94 5,445 400 14 103
1995-99 4,775 590 24 91
Note: Averages over 5-year periods.
When defining entry and exit our main concern is the treatment of plants that are
present in the panel for one or more years and then absent for some years before they
reappear in the panel again. Although the logic of the census would imply that a plant
is not in operation if it is not observed in the census, we assume that when a plant is
missing from the census for one or two consecutive years, this is due to lack of registration
rather than a temporary closure. When a plant disappears for three or more consecutive
years before it reappears in the census, we regard it as temporarily closed and thus count
an extra exit and entry for that plant. We also define as temporarily closed those plants
that are missing for two consecutive years, but reappear with a new owner (a new firm
identification number). Thus we define a plant as an entrant in year t if it appears for the
first time in year t, or reappears in that year after a temporary closure. Similarly we define
an exit in year t if the plant is present in year t and temporarily closed in t+ 1, or absent
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all subsequent years.14
In Table 2.1 we show the average annual number of foreign and domestic plants per
5 year period during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the average yearly greenfield entry
and acquisition numbers. Figure 2.2 then displays the net foreign and domestic entry
rates, and the net foreign acquisition rate, calculated for overlapping 5 year periods. The
foreign net entry rate is very small for the whole period, while the domestic net entry rate
is negative, with a peak in exits during the recession in the early 1990s. This creates a
trough in the net entry rate. The negative net entry rate reflects the overall trend in the
economy of moving resources out of manufacturing into the services sectors. During the
period of analysis the number of observations in our sample decreased from 6,990 in 1978
to 4,850 in 2001. During the same period total manufacturing employment declined by
33% from 330,000 in 1978 to 220,000 in 2001.15 By comparing the development in foreign
acquisitions with the foreign and domestic net entry rates in Figure 2.2, we can conclude
that the increase in foreign presence in Norwegian manufacturing over the last 25 years is
mainly due to net exit of domestic plants and foreign acquisitions of domestic plants.
Figure 2.2: Net foreign and domestic entry rates
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The net foreign acq. rate is defined as the foreign acq. rate minus the rate of foreign divestures.
The figure is based on the sample of large plants.
14Less than 2.5% of the plants in the sample have what we define as temporary closures.
15Haskel et al. (2002) report a similar trend for UK manufacturing employment, a decline of 36% from
1980 to 1992.
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For the econometric analysis we clean the data with respect to missing observations
and outliers.16 First, we drop plants with missing information on inputs or output for 80%
or more of their life. We then drop observations with negative profit margins and negative
value added. We also exclude sector 342, "Printing, publishing and allied industries" from
our sample. Klette (1999), in his estimations of markups and scale parameters using the
same data, concluded that the results from this sector were implausible and should be
ignored. The printing sector has experienced a dramatic technological change over the
period: it went from manual typesetting to computerized printing. Thus, the changes in
this sector may be so large that results are not representative. Alternatively, there may be
particular data problems affecting productivity estimates for the printing and publishing
sector. When we include this sector, the results - except for the foreign presence (FP )
variable - go in the same direction as our main results in Section 2.4, but the coefficients
are 2-3 times as large. By excluding the printing sector (ISIC 342), we are thus making it
more difficult for ourselves to obtain significant results.
Our cleaned sample contains 112,000 observations from 9,110 plants. This constitutes
75% of our initial sample from 1978-2001. Average plant size is almost the same (it increases
from 43.0 to 43.9 employees), and the share of foreign plants is virtually unaffected. The
number of plants per year in our cleaned sample is 5,410 in 1978, down to 3,630 in 2001.
2.4 Results
We estimate the first-differenced equation (2.3) on those plants that are Norwegian owned
throughout their presence in our sample. Summary statistics of the regression variables
for the domestic plants sample are presented in Table 2.6 in the Appendix. The results
of estimating equation (2.3) using the overall change in foreign presence as defined in
equation (2.4) are presented in the first column of Table 2.2. All inputs are significant. The
coefficients on market share, concentration, and profit margin have the expected negative
sign. This indicates that reduced competitive pressure has a negative effect on productivity,
although the concentration index is only significant at the 10% level. The measure of
16We experimented with several cleaning procedures. In one alternative we define multiple outliers on
plant level changes in output, materials use and hours from one year to the next according to the method by
Hadi (1994), and defined as outliers all observations in the 1st and 99th percentile. In another alternative,
we defined as outliers all observations with cost shares of capital, materials, or labour in the 1st and 99th
percentile of observations for each year and 3-digit industry. All cleaning procedures drop observations
evenly across 2-digit industries, and drop more observations after 1995. The main conclusions in section
2.4 hold for all cleaning procedures.
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openness has a positive coefficient, hence higher imports enhance domestic productivity,
while the turnover rate is not significant. The change in overall foreign presence is entered
with its current value and two lags. Only the coefficient on the current change in foreign
presence is significantly different from zero and has a positive sign, but the effect is small.
In the row with
∑
∆FP we sum the three coefficients on the change in foreign presence:
their accumulated effect is positive, but not significant. This is in line with previous results
for Norway reported by Grünfeld (2002).
As argued in section 2.2, the effect of a change in foreign presence on productivity
growth may depend on the market structure of the industry. Thus, in column 2 we include
interaction terms between the 5-firm concentration measure and the change in foreign
presence. This gives an indication of whether a change in foreign presence in concentrated
sectors has a different effect from a change in foreign presence in less concentrated sectors.
Including the interaction terms results in a significant and positive accumulated effect. The
signs of the interaction terms go in opposite directions. In order to investigate these effects
further, we split our sample at the median concentration level and run the regression of
column 1 in Table 2.2 on these two samples separately. These results show a positive effect
of foreign presence in low-concentration sectors, and no significant effect of foreign presence
in high-concentration sectors.17
By virtue of observability, our sample consists only of those plants that survive. Hence,
if foreign presence affects the probability of survival, our earlier estimates may be biased.
In the last column of Table 2.2 we re-estimate column 2 using the 2-step Heckman selection
procedure where survival is conditioned on investment and capital, see e.g. Haskel et al.
(2002). This is to capture the idea that investment which is observable but not correlated
with current output can pick up unobservable shocks to productivity. It can be considered
a "reduced" form of the more structural approach to the exit decision taken in Olley and
Pakes (1996). In this equation, selection is determined by the plants’ investment shares18
and capital in logs, each from levels up to their 4th powers. The results are very similar to
those in column 2 without the selection correction. The variables in the selection probit
are jointly significant, as indicated by the χ2 value. The selection term ρ is also significant.
We also tried to condition survival on a probit of so-called hazard variables that have been
17The sum of the three coefficients on the change in foreign presence is 0.108 with p-value 0.009 in the
low-concentration sectors (sectors with CR5It < 0.25) and in high-concentration sectors the effect is 0.009
with p-value 0.628. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as an alternative concentration measure in the
regressions of Table 2.2 gives very much the same results.
18As zeros in investment are meaningful observations (see Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003) for Norway),
we prefer to scale investment by dividing by annual averages instead of taking logs.
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Table 2.2: Foreign Presence and Domestic Productivity
Dependent variable ∆ lnYit
(1) (2) (selection)
∆ lnKit .058 (.003)∗∗ .058 (.003)∗∗ .055 (.003)∗∗
∆ lnMit .520 (.005)∗∗ .520 (.005)∗∗ .528 (.005)∗∗
∆ lnHit .290 (.007)∗∗ .290 (.007)∗∗ .281 (.006)∗∗
∆MSi,t−1 −.332 (.065)∗∗ −.332 (.065)∗∗ −.298 (.064)∗∗
∆PMi,t−1 −.375 (.009)∗∗ −.375 (.009)∗∗ −.378 (.009)∗∗
∆CR5I,t −.025 (.014)(∗) −.026 (.014)(∗) −.021 (.014)
∆OPENI,t .074 (.018)∗∗ .074 (.018)∗∗ .070 (.018)∗∗
TurnoverI,t−1 .015 (.013) .015 (.013) .025 (.013)∗
∆FPI,t .021 (.009)∗ .036 (.024) .034 (.023)
∆FPI,t−1 −.001 (.010) −.006 (.027) .013 (.028)
∆FPI,t−2 .005 (.009) .056 (.026)∗ .048 (.026)∗
(∆FP ∗ CR5)I,t −.024 (.035) −.021 (.035)
(∆FP ∗ CR5)I,t−1 .008 (.041) −.025 (.041)
(∆FP ∗ CR5)I,t−2 −.086 (.038)∗ −.062 (.040)∑
∆FPI
[p−value]
.026
[.125]
.086
[.044]
.094
[.025]
R2 .79 .79 −
χ2 (1)
ρ(SE)
− − 11.54
−.049(.014)
N 61, 929 61, 929 63, 623
Plants 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558
Notes: ∗∗,∗ ,(∗) indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Year and
3-digit industry dummies included in all regressions. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the plant level in round parentheses.
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found to determine exit, see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (2002). The hazard variables are plant
age, age squared, plant size (measured as the number of employees), labour productivity,
a multiplant dummy that takes value one if the plant is part of a multiplant firm, and
foreign presence. This selection equation yields similar results.
As argued earlier, the measure of foreign presence used combines the effects from recent
foreign entrants and employment changes in longer-term foreign firms. In addition, the
measure is not able to distinguish between different modes of foreign entry. Thus, we
proceed by splitting the overall change in foreign presence according to equation (2.5).
Results are presented in Table 2.3. The estimated coefficients on the input and competition
variables do not change much when we split the change in foreign presence variable, thus
the coefficients on inputs and competition variables are not reported.
In column 1 of Table 2.3 the coefficients on greenfield entry are negative, with the
first lag of greenfield entry being significant. Their accumulated effect is negative and
significant at the 5% level. Regarding acquisitions, only the current foreign acquisition
rate is significant with a positive sign. The accumulated effect of foreign acquisitions is
positive and significant at the 10% level, but it is small in economic terms. The effect of
the remaining change in foreign presence ∆FI is close to zero and insignificant.
In column 2, we add the interaction terms between the components of change in foreign
presence and concentration in order to investigate whether the effects of foreign entry on
productivity growth differ according to the level of industry concentration. The coefficients
on current greenfield entry and its first lag are negative and significant; and their accu-
mulated effect is substantially larger in absolute terms than in column 1. The interaction
terms between greenfield entry (and lagged greenfield entry) and the concentration mea-
sure are positive and significant. This suggests that the negative effect of foreign entry is
particularly strong in less concentrated industries. Industries with high levels of concen-
tration are hardly affected at all, indicating that plants in these sectors are better able to
face the increase in competition from foreign greenfield entry.
In the case of foreign acquisitions, the coefficients on the acquisition rate are positive
in column 2 but, as in column 1, only the coefficient on the current acquisition rate is
significant. The positive accumulated effect of acquisitions is significant at the 1% level,
and as in the case of greenfield entry, the effect is substantially larger in absolute terms
than in column 1. The interactions between the acquisition terms and the concentration
index are negative, suggesting that in highly concentrated industries acquisitions have a
negative impact on the productivity of domestic firms. Regarding the remaining change
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Table 2.3: Modes of Foreign Entry and Domestic Productivity
Dependent variable ∆ lnYit
(1) (2) (selection)
GI,t −.040 (.061) −.399 (.196)∗ −.508 (.202)∗∗
GI,t−1 −.100 (.050)∗ −.687 (.195)∗∗ −.666 (.204)∗∗
GI,t−2 −.043 (.054) .007 (.223) −.167 (.223)
AI,t .032 (.012)∗∗ .082 (.031)∗∗ .079 (.031)∗∗
AI,t−1 .002 (.013) .052 (.034) .048 (.034)
AI,t−2 .002 (.014) .055 (.035) .063 (.036)(∗)
∆FI,t .013 (.017) −.008 (.042) −.011 (.041)
∆FI,t−1 .007 (.017) −.039 (.047) .022 (.047)
∆FI,t−2 .005 (.015) .051 (.043) .013 (.044)
(G ∗ CR5)I,t .497 (.260)(∗) .653 (.269)∗∗
(G ∗ CR5)I,t−1 .812 (.243)∗∗ .785 (.253)∗∗
(G ∗ CR5)I,t−2 −.064 (.285) .161 (.289)
(A ∗ CR5)I,t −.083 (.046)(∗) −.081 (.045)(∗)
(A ∗ CR5)I,t−1 −.084 (.051)(∗) −.081 (.051)
(A ∗ CR5)I,t−2 −.092 (.053)(∗) −.100 (.053)(∗)
(∆F ∗ CR5)I,t .040 (.064) .048 (.062)
(∆F ∗ CR5)I,t−1 .082 (.073) −.013 (.072)
(∆F ∗ CR5)I,t−2 −.072 (.066) .007 (.068)∑
GI
[p−value]
−.183
[.054]
−1.079
[.000]
−1.341
[.000]∑
AI
[p−value]
.036
[.065]
.190
[.000]
.190
[.000]∑
∆FI
[p−value]
.025
[.311]
.003
[.961]
.024
[.716]
R2 .79 .79 −
χ2 (1)
ρ(SE)
− − 11.16
−.049(.015)
N 61, 929 61, 929 63, 623
Plants 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558
Notes: ∗∗,∗ ,(∗) indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Input
coefficients not reported. Year and 3-digit industry dummies included in all
regressions. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the plant level
in round parentheses.
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in foreign presence, ∆FIt, introducing the interaction terms does not give a clearer picture
of any effect of these changes in foreign presence on the productivity growth of domestic
plants. Also with the interaction terms included, the accumulated effect of the ∆F -terms
remains insignificant.
In the third column of Table 2.3 we re-estimate column 2 using the Heckman selec-
tion model described above. The individual coefficients have mostly the same sign and
significance level as in column 2. The result for the accumulated effect of greenfield entry
is stronger, i.e. more negative, while the results on foreign acquisitions and the remain-
ing change in foreign presence are not affected. Again conditioning selection on hazard
variables and the GIt, AIt and ∆FIt measures gives similar results.
As in the case of an overall change in foreign presence, we split the sample into low-
and high-concentration sectors and estimate the regression of column 1 in Table 2.3 on
these two samples separately.19 The results for the low-concentration sectors are presented
in the first column of Table 2.4. The effect of greenfield entry is negative, while foreign
acquisitions have a positive effect on the productivity growth of domestic plants. As an
example, the coefficient on the first lag of greenfield entry implies that a one percentage
point increase in last year’s greenfield entry rate is associated with a decrease in current
productivity growth of 0.52 percent. From the second column of Table 2.4 we find no
significant effect of greenfield foreign entrants on productivity growth in high-concentration
sectors. The effect from foreign acquisitions in high-concentration sectors is ambiguous.
The current acquisition rate is positive and significant, whereas the second lag is negative
and significant which results in an insignificant accumulated effect. The remaining change
in foreign presence (∆F ) has a positive effect, suggesting a small spillover effect from
the foreign plants that are not recent entrants into the sector. In small and transparent
industries, the domestic firms may be in a better position to appropriate knowledge from
foreign firms and thus benefit from spillovers. We obtain similar results as in Table 2.4
if we use the Herfindahl index as an alternative measure of concentration and split the
sample at its median.
19Note that when splitting the sample at the median of CR5 = 0.25, the low-concentration sample
contains 18 of 132 5-digit sectors (7 of these are in the food sector and 5 in the metal industry).
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Table 2.4: Modes of Foreign Entry and Domestic Productivity in Low- and
High-Concentration Sectors
Dependent variable ∆ lnYit
(low conc) (high conc)
GI,t −.107 (.164) −.002 (.068)
GI,t−1 −.524 (.167)∗∗ .004 (.047)
GI,t−2 .050 (.192) −.024 (.057)
AI,t .046 (.034) .027 (.014)∗
AI,t−1 .074 (.032)∗ −.015 (.014)
AI,t−2 .124 (.033)∗∗ −.034 (.015)∗
∆FI,t .040 (.042) .012 (.019)
∆FI,t−1 −.017 (.046) .015 (.018)
∆FI,t−2 −.067 (.038)(∗) .032 (.017)(∗)∑
GI
[p−value]
−.581
[.020]
−.022
[.819]∑
AI
[p−value]
.244
[.000]
−.022
[.316]∑
∆FI
[p−value]
−.044
[.447]
.060
[.034]
R2 .80 .79
N 34, 576 27, 353
Plants 3, 789 3, 028
Notes: ∗∗,∗ ,(∗) indicate significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% respectively. Coefficients on inputs and
competition variables not reported. Year and
3-digit industry dummies included in all regres-
sions.Robust standard errors adjusted for cluster-
ing at the plant level in round parentheses.
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To summarise, we find a significant and positive effect of an overall change in foreign
presence on the productivity growth of domestic plants in low-concentration sectors. How-
ever, when focusing explicitly on foreign entrants, we find that this is the result of two
opposing effects from the recent foreign entrants. Greenfield entry has a negative impact
on the productivity growth of domestic plants in less concentrated industries. Entry via
acquisition affects domestic productivity growth positively. The effect of greenfield entry
is stronger in absolute terms than that of acquisitions, but since foreign acquisition is the
most frequent mode of entry, the acquisition effect dominates in the effect of an overall
change in foreign presence (cf. Table 2.2).
For the low-concentration industries, the negative effect of greenfield entry on produc-
tivity could be due to a market stealing effect as argued by Aitken and Harrison (1999). In
order to investigate this possibility further, we do a number of additional regressions. When
repeating the regression of column 1 in Table 2.4 without controlling for the use of inputs,
we find that the accumulated effect of greenfield entry in the low-concentration sectors is
stronger on output (−1.549 [.001]) than on productivity (−0.581 [.020] from column 1 of
Table 2.4). Given that our data do not contain information about prices, we do not know
whether this is primarily a price or a quantity effect. Using profit margins as the left-hand
side variable instead of output, with the remaining competition variables as right-hand
side controls, yields no strong evidence of a price effect: two of the coefficients on GI are
positive while one is negative and the accumulated coefficient for the GIt variables is not
significant (.122 [.350]). We also looked at how greenfield entry affects the use of materials
and labour by using the change in these inputs as our dependent variable while controlling
for competition in addition to the foreign entry variables on the right-hand side. These
regressions give accumulated coefficients on
∑
GIt equal to (−1.706 [.021]) for material
inputs and (−.802 [.134]) for hours, and none of the individual coefficients on the GI-terms
were significant. Thus it seems that plants in low-concentration sectors are able to reduce
their use of materials as their output falls due to greenfield entry, but the negative effect
on labour use is not significant. All in all, we take these results as suggesting that the tran-
sitory decline in productivity growth that seems to follow greenfield entry in sectors with
low concentration rates is primarily caused by the domestic firms not sufficiently adjusting
their use of labour in the short run.
Turning to the effect of foreign entry by acquisition, our results show that acquisitions
are associated with higher productivity growth for domestic plants in low-concentration
sectors, with the largest effect 2 years after entry. Given that we did not expect any (im-
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mediate) changes in market structure in the acquisition case, it is plausible that we do not
find a negative competition effect. In fact, foreign acquisitions appear to give the existing
firms in the market time to adapt, possibly because they are themselves handicapped by
substantial in-house restructuring after a takeover. In addition, established links from the
acquired plant to other domestic plants may serve as a channel for knowledge spillovers.
2.5 Robustness analysis
In Table 2.5, we report the results for a number of robustness checks. The regressions in
the upper panel of Table 2.5 are all variations of equation (2.3) as reported in column 2
of Table 2.3. In the lower panel of the table we report the same variations of equation
(2.3) on the sample of low-concentration sectors, thus the results in the lower panel are
comparable to column 1 of Table 2.4. We only report the sum of coefficients on GI , AI
and ∆FI .
In columns 1 and 7 of Table 2.5, we report the results of a more general specification of
equation (2.3) in which we allow the coefficients on inputs to vary across 3-digit industries
by interacting the inputs with industry dummies. Our specifications in Tables 2.3 and
2.4 constrain the input elasticities to be the same for all manufacturing industries. This
might disregard important differences between industries and thus bias our estimates of
the effects of foreign entry. However, the overall effects of foreign entry and acquisitions
are very similar to the results reported in column 2 of Table 2.3 and column 1 of Table 2.4.
Production function estimation has been shown to yield poor results when important
unobservables that vary both across plants and over time, such as productivity shocks, are
omitted. This suggests that differencing and controlling for plant fixed effects may yield
poor estimates of input use and, moreover, it may not be sufficient to render the error
term εit in equation (2.1) white noise. Olley and Pakes (1996) show that such unobservable
shocks can be proxied for by investment behavior, on the assumption that these shocks
influence current investment, but - since investment takes time - not current output. Their
approach requires that plants do not undertake zero investment, which is not the case for
about 25% of the observations in our sample. Instead, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose
using intermediate inputs rather than investment to address the underlying simultaneity
problem. To make sure that our results are not affected by this problem, we estimate total
factor productivity (TFP) as the residuals of a Cobb-Douglas production function at the
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Table 2.5: Robustness
Dep. var. ∆lnYit ∆ln TFPit ∆ TFPit ∆ln LPit ∆ lnYit ∆lnYit
Check 3-digit levpet translog labour Direct Majority
inp. coeff. residuals index prod. foreign foreign
Full sample with concentration interactions (cf. Table 2.3 col (2))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∑
GI
[p−value]
−1.066
[.000]
−1.107
[.000]
−1.324
[.000]
−1.551
[.001]
−1.438
[.041]
−2.342
[.001]∑
AI
[p−value]
.199
[.000]
.206
[.000]
.206
[.000]
.124
[.174]
.242
[.003]
.207
[.001]∑
∆FI
[p−value]
−.016
[.810]
.086
[.214]
.032
[.617]
−.109
[.430]
−.021
[.809]
−.091
[.373]
R2 .81 .06 .07 .03 .79 .79
N 61, 929 61, 922 61, 924 61, 929 61, 929 61, 929
Plants 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558 6, 558
Low-concentration sectors only (cf. Table 2.4 col (low conc))
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∑
GI
[p−value]
−.698
[.003]
−.574
[.025]
−1.062
[.000]
−.747
[.112]
−.494
[.308]
−1.641
[.002]∑
AI
[p−value]
.264
[.000]
.272
[.000]
.247
[.000]
−.063
[.478]
.353
[.001]
.160
[.006]∑
∆FI
[p−value]
−.066
[.244]
.008
[.896]
−.049
[.368]
−.092
[.444]
−.150
[.123]
−.238
[.012]
R2 .81 .07 .08 .03 .80 .80
N 34, 576 34, 574 34, 576 34, 576 34, 576 34, 576
Plants 3, 789 3, 789 3, 789 3, 789 3, 789 3, 789
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2-digit level according to the Levinsohn-Petrin method.20 In columns 2 and 8 of Table
2.5 we report the results of using this measure as our dependent variable in estimating
equation (2.3) omitting the inputs on the right hand side. The results are similar to our
original specifications.
In columns 3 and 9 we use as our measure of productivity growth a superlative index
of total factor productivity growth used by Aghion et al. (2005), which is derived from
a flexible translog specification of the production technology, see Caves et al. (1982a,
1982b).21 The results from using this measure are very similar to those of the specification
in Table 2.3. The accumulated effect of greenfield entry is stronger in absolute terms. In
column 4 and 10 of Table 2.5 we report results for labour productivity. Labour productivity
will not be affected by potentially poor measurement or poor estimation of the capital
stock variable. Also here, the results for greenfield entry point in the same direction as our
previous results; but the effect of acquisitions is not significant.
As noted in Section 2.3, from 1990 onwards our definition of foreign ownership includes
both directly and indirectly foreign-owned plants. We re-estimate our original specifica-
tions with our foreign entry and acquisition variables based on, respectively, direct foreign
ownership at the 20% threshold in columns 5 and 11 of Table 2.5, and on majority for-
eign ownership (direct + indirect) in columns 6 and 12. In both cases the coefficients
on greenfield entry in the upper panel (columns 5 and 6) are negative and stronger than
in the reference equation, and this also holds for majority foreign greenfield entry in the
low-concentration sectors (column 12). This is in line with earlier results suggesting that
the effects from majority foreign-owned enterprises are largest (e.g. Smarzynska-Javorcik
and Spatareanu (2003)). Overall, we conclude that our results are not sensitive to how
foreign ownership is defined or to the measure of total factor productivity used.
2.6 Conclusions
Our aim in this chapter was to bring new insights into the spillover debate by distinguishing
between new and existing foreign firms, and furthermore between different modes of foreign
entry. In our data, an overall change in foreign presence has a small positive impact on
productivity growth of domestic plants in low-concentration sectors, and no effect in more
20In the absence of an appropriate deflator we use the share of energy in material use to proxy for
unobserved productivity shocks.
21Details on the construction of this index are presented in the Appendix.
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concentrated sectors. The effect in low-concentration sectors is generated by the recent
foreign entrants, with opposite effects from greenfield entrants and foreign acquisitions. The
impact of greenfield entry on domestic productivity growth is negative in low-concentration
sectors. The negative effect of greenfield entry on the productivity growth of domestic
plants in low-concentration sectors seems to be primarily due to these plants not adjusting
their use of inputs (in particular labour) in the short run. The negative competition effect
associated with greenfield entry in low-concentration sectors is not found for acquisitions.
We find a positive effect of foreign acquisitions on the productivity growth of domestic
plants in these industries, with the largest effect 2 years after entry. This suggests that
established links from the acquired plant to other domestic plants may serve as a channel
for knowledge spillovers. In highly concentrated sectors we find no significant effect of
either of the recent entrants on domestic productivity growth.
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Table 2.6: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Levels
lnYit 9.522 1.230 4.304 14.521 61,929
lnKit 7.257 1.253 1.792 12.300 61,929
lnMit 8.694 1.440 0.417 14.402 61,929
lnHit 3.368 1.070 -3.937 8.593 61,929
MSit 0.017 0.047 0 1 61,929
PMit 0.140 0.094 0 0.918 61,929
investment 0 0 -0.007 0.020 61,929
CR5It 0.674 0.260 0.091 1 2,581
HHIIt 0.193 0.173 0.007 1 2,581
OPENIt 0.645 0.192 0.034 0.956 2,581
turnoverIt 0.069 0.080 0 1 2,581
FPIt 0.203 0.257 0 0.987 2,581
GIt 0.002 0.020 0 0.734 2,581
AIt 0.024 0.091 0 0.951 2,581
FIt 0.177 0.243 0 0.987 2,581
Differences
∆ lnYit 0.012 0.313 -6.203 4.246 61,929
∆ lnKit 0.034 0.319 -4.395 3.517 61,929
∆ lnMit 0.025 0.428 -7.014 6.110 61,929
∆ lnHit -0.012 0.342 -7.336 7.293 61,929
∆MSit 0 0.012 -0.684 0.688 61,929
∆PMit -0.003 0.085 -0.857 0.831 61,929
Note: Summary statistics for industry level variables are reported for
5-digit industry-year cells.
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Data and variable definitions
AIt Employment in plants that were acquired by a foreign owner between years t and t−1
as a share of 5-digit industry employment in year t.
CR5It Joint market share of the 5 largest plants in a 5-digit industry in terms of output
relative to industry output.
FIt Employment in foreign-owned plants present in year t and in year t − 1 as a share of
5-digit industry employment in year t.
FPIt Employment in foreign-owned plants as a share of 5-digit industry employment in
year t.
GIt Employment in foreign-owned plants present in year t but not in year t− 1 as a share
of 5-digit industry employment in year t.
Hit Number of person hours in the plant. Since only blue-collar hours are reported prior
to 1983, and only total hours from 1983, we estimate total hours before 1983 by using
information on the blue-collar share of the total wage bill. Rented labour hours are
calculated from the costs of rented labour using the calculated average wage for own
employees.
HHIIt Herfindahl-Hirschman index defined as the sum over the squares of each plant’s
market share in its 5-digit industry.
Kit Our estimate of capital services uses the following aggregation:
Kit = Rit + (0.07 + δ
m)V mit + (0.07 + δ
b)V bit,
where Rit is the cost of rented capital in the plant, V mit and V bit are the estimated values
of machinery and buildings at the beginning of the year, δm = 0.06 and δb = 0.02
are the depreciation rates that we use. We take the rate of return to capital to be
0.07. The values for depreciation rates and the rate of return to capital are also
used by Salvanes and Førre (2003) using the same data. The estimated values of
buildings and machinery are obtained from information on fire insurance values. To
reduce noise and avoid discarding too many observations with missing fire insurance
values, we smooth these values using the perpetual inventory method. Fire insurance
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values are not recorded after 1995, thus from 1996 we estimate capital values by
adding investments and taking account of depreciation. Where possible, we also
use estimates of firm level capital values (distributed to the plant level according to
employment shares) as starting values for plants with entry after 1995. These capital
values are obtained from recent work to improve on capital estimates in Norwegian
manufacturing (see Raknerud et al. (2003)). We use separate price deflators for
inputs and output and for investment in buildings and machinery obtained from
Statistics Norway. The aggregation level for the price deflators is according to the
sector classification used in the National Accounts, which is somewhere in between
the 2- and 3-digit ISIC level.
LPit Labour productivity defined as output per hour.
Mit Total cost of materials used. Since this variable in the data includes rented labour
and capital, we subtract these and allocate them to the labour and capital measures
respectively.
MSit Plant output as a share of 5-digit industry output.
OPENIt Rate of imports over imports plus exports (OPENIt =MIt/(MIt+XIt)). Import
and export data are taken from the OECD ITCS International Trade Data SITC Rev.
2 and have been converted to 3 digit ISIC Rev. 2 codes using a conversion table
provided by Maskus (1989). The data are converted into NOK using the annual
average exchange rate provided in the International Financial Statistics.
PMit Net output less material and wage costs divided by 5-digit industry output.
TurnoverIt (Total number of plants entering in year t + total number of plants exiting in
year t)/(Total number of plants in year t)
∆TFPit The measure of TFP growth is derived from a flexible translog specification of
the production technology.
∆TFPit = ∆ lnYit −
∑
z=M,K,H
α˜zit∆ ln x
z
it, (2.6)
where xzit is the quantity used of factor z in plant i at time t. The Divisia share α˜zit is
defined as α˜zit = (αzit+αzit−1)/2 where αzit is the cost share of factor z relative to total
output value Y in plant i at time t. We impose constant returns to scale. Since there
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could be substantial noise in the observed factor shares αzit, we apply a smoothing
procedure proposed by Harrigan (1997). Assuming a translog production technology,
constant returns to scale (CRS), and standard market-clearing conditions, αzit can be
expressed as follows:
αzit = ψi + ϕIt +
∑
z=M,H
ωIt ln(
xzit
xKit
) (2.7)
where ψi is a plant-specific constant, ϕIt an industry-time-specific constant and where
we normalize relative to capital use to impose CRS. If the observed factor shares
deviate from the left-hand side of this equation by an i.i.d. measurement error term,
then the parameters can be estimated by running separate fixed effects panel data
regressions for each industry I. We estimate equation (2.7) separately for each 3-
digit ISIC industry, and use the fitted values from (2.7) as the factor shares in the
calculation of (2.6).
Yit Gross production value net of sales taxes and subsidies.
Chapter 3
Is mobility of labour a channel for spillovers
from multinationals to local domestic firms?
Abstract
This chapter documents the extent of labour mobility from multinationals
(MNEs) to non-MNEs in Norwegian manufacturing during the 1990s. On aver-
age, each year around one percent of workers in MNEs move to non-MNEs. By
the year 2000, 45 percent of the non-MNEs employed workers with experience
from MNEs. These workers earned a wage premium of more than 3 percent
compared to their new colleagues in the non-MNEs. I estimate a Cobb-Douglas
production function for non-MNEs and include the share of workers with recent
MNE experience. Consistent with mobility being a channel for knowledge dif-
fusion, I find that these workers contribute 20-25 percent more to productivity
than workers without experience from MNEs. The difference between the pri-
vate returns to mobility and the productivity effect at the plant level suggests
that labour mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs represents a true knowledge
externality.
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3.1 Introduction
The empirical literature on knowledge spillovers from foreign direct investment to host
country firms, treats the channels through which such spillovers may occur as a black box.
The labour mobility channel for spillovers has been highlighted both in theoretical models
(Fosfuri et al., 2001; Glass and Saggi, 2002), and in the empirical literature (for recent
surveys of the empirical spillover literature, see Saggi, 2002 and Görg and Greenaway,
2004). The general approach of the empirical spillover literature is to regress a measure
of domestic plant productivity on a measure of foreign presence at the industry level.
When measuring foreign presence at the industry level it is not possible to capture the
fact that domestic firms may have different links with foreign-owned firms. The more
contact domestic firms have with foreign-owned firms, the more likely they are to benefit
from spillovers. One type of contact with foreign-owned firms is to hire workers from these
firms. I use linked employer-employee data to construct plant-specific measures for the
share of workers in domestic plants with recent experience from multinationals. By using
this measure of an explicit link between domestic and multinational firms in a productivity
regression, I am able to go beyond the ‘black box’-treatment of spillovers in the existing
empirical literature. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to use extensive
linked employer-employee data to estimate the productivity effect of labour mobility from
foreign to domestic firms in a host country.
In order for labour mobility to be a channel for spillovers from foreign to domestic
firms, we would expect to observe the following: First, foreign-owned firms should have
a firm-specific advantage that could be the basis for spillovers. A firm-specific advantage
would give rise to extra profits in these firms. If firms share rents with their workers,
observing a wage premium for workers in foreign-owned firms would be consistent with a
potential for spillovers. Second, we should be able to document a nontrivial magnitude of
foreign to domestic labour mobility. Third, domestic plants that hire workers with previous
experience from foreign firms should benefit in terms of increased productivity. Fourth,
the foreign to domestic movers should benefit from mobility in terms of their own wages,
and their experience from foreign-owned firms should be valued by their new firms. In this
chapter, I use linked employer-employee data to assess the evidence on all four points for
Norwegian manufacturing during the 1990s.
The existence of a firm-specific advantage combined with evidence of actual mobility
can only suggest that a potential for spillovers through labour mobility does exist, while
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a productivity benefit at the plant level due to mobility is consistent with labour mobility
actually working as a channel for spillovers. To what extent such spillovers can be regarded
as an externality, and not only as knowledge diffusion through market transactions, cannot
be determined from a positive productivity effect alone.1 An assessment of the size of the
productivity benefit together with information about the wage increase obtained by the
mobile workers may indicate to what extent a possible spillover is an externality. If the
productivity benefit at the plant level is larger than the wage premium granted to workers
with experience from MNEs, the evidence is consistent with a knowledge externality.
Foreign-owned firms are thought to be a relevant source of spillovers because they are
part of MNEs with firm-specific assets that can be transferred across borders within the
firm (Dunning, 1981; Markusen, 1995). It has recently been argued that the firm-specific
advantage hypothesis, which is thought to be a reason for firms becoming multinational,
should apply equally to domestic multinationals of the host country (Doms and Jensen,
1998; Bellak, 2004). The argument implies that the potential for spillovers should pri-
marily go from multinationals to purely local firms, regardless of whether a multinational
is foreign or domestically owned. The empirical analysis here will distinguish mainly be-
tween multinationals and local domestic plants, hereafter called MNEs and non-MNEs
respectively.
As a first exercise to assess the potential for knowledge spillovers from MNEs to non-
MNEs in Norwegian manufacturing, I look for evidence of a multinational advantage by
estimating individual wage equations for manufacturing workers. I find a foreign MNE
premium of 2,5% relative to non-MNEs, while Norwegian MNEs seem to give a wage
premium only to workers with high education. The results are consistent with a potential
for spillovers from MNEs to non-MNEs.
Little is known about the extent and pattern of labour mobility between foreign and
domestic firms in a developed country, despite the frequent claim that it is a potential
channel for spillovers.2 Martins (2006) is the first to provide such evidence for a developed
country, using a large panel of linked employer-employee data that covers virtually all firms
and their employees in Portugal from 1986 to 2000. He finds relatively small labour flows
between foreign and domestic firms. In this chapter I focus only on labour mobility within
manufacturing. Partly because labour mobility between manufacturing and other sectors of
1Møen (2005) argues that if the hiring firm pays wages according to the marginal productivity of the
new employee, a productivity benefit in the hiring firms is not an externality.
2Some case study evidence of foreign to domestic mobility in developing countries exists, see references
in Saggi (2002) and Görg and Strobl (2005a).
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the economy is likely to be lower than mobility within the manufacturing sector, and partly
because knowledge acquired in other sectors may be of limited relevance in manufacturing.
I find that on average, each year around 1% of workers in MNEs leave to join a non-MNE.
However, this translates into a growing percentage of workers in non-MNEs with experience
from MNEs. In the year 2000 15% of workers in non-MNEs had experience from MNEs,
while 45% of non-MNEs in 2000 employed one or more workers with MNE experience, up
from 18% in 1995. Thus, from the perspective of non-MNEs, labour mobility from MNEs
seems to be large enough to play a role as a channel for spillovers in Norway, at least during
the second half of the 1990s.
Given the extent of mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs, I proceed to estimate the
effect of this mobility on the productivity of non-MNEs. Previously, this has only been
examined empirically by Görg and Strobl (2005a), who use firm level data for a sample
of manufacturing plants in Ghana. They find that firms whose entrepreneurs worked in
multinationals in the same industry prior to joining or setting up their own firm are more
productive than other firms, while experience from multinationals in a different industry
has no effect on firm productivity. In contrast to the data from Ghana, I can determine the
recent work history of all workers in non-MNEs. I include annual plant level measures of
the share of workers with recent MNE experience in a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Based on an interpretation provided by Griliches (1967, 1986), I find that workers with
MNE experience contribute 20-25% more to total factor productivity than workers without
experience from MNEs. This result is consistent with the idea that labour mobility from
MNEs to non-MNEs is a channel for spillovers.
When looking at the wages of movers compared to colleagues with similar characteristics
in their new plant, I find that movers from MNEs to non-MNEs with more than 3 years’
experience from MNEs receive a wage premium of almost 5% compared to stayers in non-
MNEs. Thus experience from MNEs is clearly valued in non-MNEs. For movers in the
other direction there is no such wage premium. These results are consistent with mobility
from MNEs to non-MNEs being a potential channel for spillovers. The difference in the
private returns to mobility for movers from MNEs to non-MNEs and the productivity effect
these movers have at the plant level, suggest that the hiring non-MNEs do not fully pay for
the value of these workers to the firm. Hence, labour mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs
seems to be a source of knowledge externality in Norwegian manufacturing.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the data
sources, followed by the empirical results regarding multinational wage premia in Section
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3.3. Section 3.4 contains descriptive evidence of labour mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs
in Norwegian manufacturing and Section 3.5 investigates whether non-MNEs that hire
workers with MNE experience benefit in terms of productivity. Section 3.6 asks whether
movers benefit from mobility in terms of wages, while Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Data
I use four different annual data bases for the years 1990-2000, all of which are censuses that
can be linked to each other by firm or plant identifiers. All the data sources are administered
by Statistics Norway. The starting point is the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics, which
is collected at the plant level. From the Manufacturing Statistics, I use information about
production, input use, investment and industry classification (ISIC Rev. 2). As the main
aim is to include measures of labour mobility into a plant level productivity framework,
plants with insufficient information to calculate a measure of total factor productivity are
excluded from the analysis. After this cleaning the remaining data still contains around
90% of manufacturing output and employment.3
In order to classify plants as MNEs or non-MNEs, I combine information obtained
from the record of foreign ownership of equity in Norwegian firms (the so-called SIFON-
register), and information from the register of outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI)
from Norway. Both registers can be linked to the Manufacturing Statistics with firm
identifiers. The SIFON-register contains information about the value and shares of equity
owned by foreign interests, as well as the nationality of the largest owners.4 The register of
outward FDI contains information about shares and votes in operations abroad controlled
by Norwegian firms, country of operation and a number of financial transactions between
the owner in Norway and the operation abroad.5 For the purpose of classifying plants as
MNEs or non-MNEs, I use the information on the shares of equity in Norwegian firms
owned by foreigners from the SIFON-register, and the shares of equity in firms abroad
owned by firms in Norway. I define a Norwegian MNE as a firm that is not itself majority
owned from abroad, while it has direct ownership shares of more than 20% in operations
abroad. A foreign MNE is more than 20% foreign owned and at the same time not classified
3For more detailed descriptions of the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics, see Halvorsen et al. (1991)
and Møen (2004).
4See Simpson (1994) for more details about the SIFON-register.
5The register of outgoing FDI has hardly been used for research so far. Grünfeld (2005) uses this
database to give an overview of foreign activities of firms based in Norway.
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as a Norwegian MNE.
Finally, I link the administrative files containing the whole population of residents aged
16-74 to the plant level data. The administrative files contain, among other things, infor-
mation on age, gender, identification of the current employer, weekly work-hours, annual
earnings, start and end dates for the current employment spell and detailed education
codes.6 Weekly work-hours are recorded as a categorical variable in 4 groups, with the
longest work-hours being 30 hours or more per week. I use only workers that are recorded
as working 30 hours or more per week, and call these workers full-time workers (more than
90% of workers are full-time workers). As a proxy for wages, I use the recorded earnings
variable in the data, where earnings are measured as annual taxable labour income.7
Table 3.1: Foreign and domestic plants and workers
Number of plants Mean empl. Full-time workers
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1990 5,211 249 216 27 83 179 141,435 20,634 38,719
1991 4,849 362 218 26 97 163 124,921 35,038 35,607
1992 4,739 390 240 25 96 161 119,181 37,474 38,677
1993 4,411 435 240 23 102 165 102,155 44,439 39,600
1994 4,455 497 219 24 92 177 106,481 45,742 38,815
1995 4,389 482 220 24 102 160 107,243 49,248 35,108
1996 4,296 512 203 24 103 151 101,375 52,715 30,651
1997 4,353 531 179 26 104 156 111,495 55,465 27,958
1998 4,282 639 159 26 94 179 111,109 60,254 28,384
1999 4,156 681 177 26 92 166 107,958 62,407 29,428
2000 3,923 689 215 26 88 128 100,231 60,615 27,421
Notes: 1=Non-MNE; 2=Foreign MNE; 3=Domestic MNE
Table 3.1 shows the total number of matched plants and full-time workers by type of
plant. The total number of manufacturing plants decreased from 5 200 in 1990 to 3 900 in
2000, and the total number of full-time workers went down from around 200 000 in 1990
to below 190 000 in 2000. While the number of Norwegian MNEs and non-MNEs and
6See Salvanes and Førre (2003) for a general description of the Norwegian linked employer–employee
data sets, see also Møen et al. (2004) for documentation.
7For the analysis of wages in Sections 3 and 6 I drop 135 000 individual observations (6% of the sample),
where the recorded earnings are considered too low for a regular full time earning. I set this threshold to
be below 12 000 NOK per month in 2001 prices. Dropping these low-wage observations does not affect the
results.
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the number of workers in these plants declined from 1990 to 2000, the number of foreign
MNEs and the number of workers in foreign MNEs tripled during the same period. Plants
of Norwegian MNEs are substantially larger in terms of the average number of workers
than plants of foreign MNEs.
3.3 Is there a multinational wage premium?
A potential for spillovers from MNEs to non-MNEs requires that the local firms have some-
thing to learn from MNEs. One piece of evidence that would suggest such a potential is
that MNEs pay higher wages than non-MNEs. Through on-the-job-experience (or train-
ing), workers in MNEs may get access to part of the MNE’s superior technology, and bring
valuable knowledge with them to a new employer. They may also set up a competing
business. In order to prevent such spillovers, the MNE may pay a wage premium to reduce
labour mobility, as discussed in the theoretical models of Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass
and Saggi (2002). In these models the MNE shares rents with its workers. MNEs may
also pay a wage premium because they are able to share rents across borders (Budd and
Slaughter, 2004). Other explanations for the wage premium are that it is a compensation
for a higher probability of plant closure (Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003), or higher labour
demand volatility (Fabri et al., 2003). Both these hypotheses of compensating differentials
are consistent with the existence of a foreign wage premium, but do not necessarily imply
that the MNE has a firm-specific advantage that could be the basis for spillovers.8
For Norwegian manufacturing there are clear differences in unconditional mean wages
between non-MNEs, domestic MNEs and foreign MNEs, see Figure 3.1. The difference
between non-MNEs and foreign MNEs is around 10%. From Table 3.2 we see that domestic
MNEs have on average more employees than foreign MNEs, and both types of MNEs
are substantially larger than non-MNEs. In terms of labour productivity and wages, the
domestic and foreign MNEs are relatively similar and both types of MNEs have higher
8Several papers investigate the extent of so-called wage-spillovers. Foreign direct investment by high
productivity firms might lead to increased wages by affecting labour demand directly, but there could also
be an indirect effect through knowledge diffusion. As noted by Aitken et al. (1996), labour turnover and
knowledge diffusion should eventually increase wages also in domestic firms and thus reduce or eliminate
the foreign wage premium (see also Barry et al., 2005). Indirect evidence of knowledge diffusion through
wage-spillovers is found for the US (Aitken et al., 1996) and the UK (Girma et al., 2001; Driffield and
Girma, 2003), while Aitken et al. (1996) find zero or even negative wage-spillovers for Venezuela and
Mexico. As these studies do not follow workers between plants, they cannot say whether labour mobility
played any role in facilitating the wage-spillovers.
76 Is mobility of labour a channel for spillovers from multinationals to local domestic firms?
Figure 3.1: Wages in MNEs and non-MNEs
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productivity and wages than non-MNEs. In terms of mean age, experience and years of
education of the workers, the three groups of plants seem very similar, though education
levels are slightly higher in MNEs than in non-MNEs. The biggest difference is found in
the length of tenure, where the Norwegian MNEs have considerably longer mean tenure
(9.3 years) than both foreign MNEs (8 years) and domestic non-MNEs (7.3 years). The
main reason for this difference is likely to be the age of the plants; the larger Norwegian
MNEs are likely to be older than the other groups of plants. The mean tenure of foreign
MNEs is to some extent affected by the recent entry of many of these plants.
When using plant level data for average wages it is a common finding that foreign
firms pay higher average wages than domestically owned firms, and that the foreign wage
premium is larger in developing countries than in developed countries.9 In many plant level
datasets it is not possible to control for the quality of the labour force when estimating the
foreign wage premium, thus part of the wage premium may be due to foreign firms using
more skilled labour than domestic firms. Studies of foreign wage premia using individual
wage data typically find smaller wage premia than studies using only plant level average
wages. This result suggests that part of the plant level premium can be explained by skill
9Aitken et al. (1996) provide evidence for Mexico, Venezuela and the United States. Lipsey and Sjøholm
(2004) provide evidence for Indonesia, and evidence of foreign wage premia in UK manufacturing are found
by Conyon et al. (2002), Girma et al. (2001) and Griffith and Simpson (2003).
3.3 Is there a multinational wage premium? 77
Table 3.2: Worker and plant characteristics: Means of annual values 1990-2000
Non-MNEs Foreign MNEs Domestic MNEs
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Real monthly wage 23,513 13,078 26,631 11,580 25,102 15,182
Tenure 7.33 6.10 7.95 6.48 9.28 6.56
Experience 22.23 12.72 22.36 12.34 22.55 12.59
Age 40.08 11.74 40.59 11.26 40.72 11.52
Years of schooling 10.54 2.37 10.92 2.74 10.87 2.56
Plant size 30.39 68.65 106.23 185.59 164.14 234.85
Labour Productivity 1224 1635 2068 8299 1817 1363
Skill share 0.36 0.22 0.44 0.21 0.39 0.19
Female share 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.27 0.22
Worker/Plant obs. 1,215,480/48,820 516,450/5,450 365,390/2,270
Notes: Experience=age-years of education-7, labour productivity is real output per
employee, skill share is share of workers with more than 11 years of education.
composition.
I estimate wage premia and control for both plant and individual observable character-
istics in the following wage regression:
wijt = β0 + β1Djt +X
′
ijtβ2 + F
′
jtβ3 + eit, (3.1)
where wijt is the log real wage of worker i employed in firm j at time t, Xijt is a vector of
observable individual characteristics and Fjt is a vector of observable plant characteristics,
while eit is an idiosyncratic error term. The main variable of interest is Djt, which is a
dummy indicating the status of the plant.
Table 3.3 reports the results from estimating equation (3.1) with OLS for Norwegian
manufacturing workers. In the upper part of the table, I analyse wage differences between
foreign and domestic plants. Djt is a dummy for foreign ownership. The lower part
of the table shows results for wage differences between MNEs and non-MNEs. In this
case, the foreign ownership dummy is replaced by 2 dummies, one indicating whether the
plant is a domestic MNE and the other indicating whether the plant is a foreign MNE.
Columns 1-5 show results using the full panel with additional sets of control variables
in each column. By comparing results in Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 3.3, we can see
that differences in observable plant characteristics are more important than the observable
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individual characteristics of workers. The foreign wage premium is reduced by almost 50%
between Column 2 and Column 3, and only plant characteristics account for the difference
between these columns. Adding individual characteristics in Column 4 has hardly any
further effect on the wage premium.
Column 6 shows the result from the model in Column 5, when the estimating sample
includes only individuals with less than 11 years of education. The result in Column 7
is for individuals with more than 15 years of education. The unconditional foreign wage
premium is around 10% in Column 1, and falls to 2.3% in Column 5 after adding industry
dummies, plant and individual characteristics. This is comparable to the 2% premium
found by Heyman et al. (2004) for Sweden in a very similar regression, while for Portugal,
Martins (2004) finds a foreign wage premium of around 10% when controlling for both
individual and plant characteristics. An interesting feature in the lower part of Table 3.3
is that domestic MNEs have lower wage premia than foreign MNEs. When controlling
for both plant and individual characteristics in Column 5, there is no wage premium in
domestic MNEs while foreign MNEs have a premium of 2.5%.10 This contrasts the findings
of Heyman et al. (2004), who find no significant difference in wage premia between foreign
and domestic MNEs, and find a wage premium of 5% for foreign MNEs relative to non-
MNEs in Sweden. In Columns 6 and 7 of Table 3.3, we can see that foreign MNEs pay
higher wages than non-MNEs to both educational groups, while domestic MNEs only have
a significant premium for the high education group. This premium is about half the size
of that in foreign MNEs.11
The wage regressions in Table 3.3 do not control for unobserved individual or firm-fixed
effects. The results are therefore likely to be affected by omitted variable bias. On the
one hand, if MNEs to a larger extent tend to select ‘better’ workers along unobserved
dimensions, this may explain part of the wage premium. On the other hand, if MNEs
systematically select better workers than non-MNEs, they may also be able to use their
human resources more efficiently. And the demand for ‘good’ workers may be connected
with their MNE status. In addition, foreign MNEs may perform better along unobserved
plant dimensions that increase their ability to pay higher wages. The results in Table 3.3
10The results in Table 3.3 are not changed if interactions of year and 2-digit industry dummies are
included.
11Comparable OLS regressions using plant level average wages as the dependent variable show a some-
what higher wage premium of 5% for foreign plants when controlling for plant characteristics, labour
productivity, year and industry dummies. Similar to the individual wage regressions, if we replace the
foreign dummy with separate dummies for foreign and domestic MNEs, there is no significant domestic
MNE wage premium, while the foreign MNE premium is 4.5%.
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indicates that to control for observable plant characteristics has more effect on the wage
premium than to control for observable individual characteristics. Therefore it is likely
that the remaining wage premium is partly due to unobservable plant effects connected
with MNE status. This is consistent with the wage premium indicating a potential for
spillovers from this group of plants.
3.4 The extent of labour mobility
In the matched panel from 1990 to 2000 we observe in total about 450 000 individuals
working in manufacturing plants. Most of these individuals stay in the same plant all
the years they are observed in a manufacturing industry, but around 20% of the workers
change plants within manufacturing and generate around 110 000 incidents of plant change.
Table 3.4 shows that almost 45% of these plant changes occur between non-MNEs. For
the group of workers with low education this percentage is 48%, while only 27% of the
job changes among the university educated workers occur between non-MNEs. For the
university educated, the largest share of plant moves (39%) occurs between MNEs.12 The
flows of workers between MNEs and non-MNEs are roughly equal in both directions for all
types of workers, thus the potential for spillovers through labour mobility seems equally
large in both directions.
Table 3.4: Direction of mobility for incidents of plant change
Education
All 1 2 3
Between non-MNEs 44.86 48.56 43.22 27.10
From non-MNE to MNEs 16.51 16.29 16.72 17.10
From MNE to non-MNEs 13.43 12.45 14.29 16.29
Between MNEs 25.20 22.70 25.77 39.51
Total moves (=100%) 110,377 61,736 39,431 9,210
Notes: 1=Non-technical education; 2=Vocational/technical education;
3=University education.
12I have divided the workers into 3 groups based on detailed educational codes from Statistics Norway.
Group 1, the low-education group, includes individuals with missing education code and workers that have
completed up to 1 year of education after compulsory schooling. In addition, this group includes workers
with completed high school without technical fields. Group 2 includes workers with technical/vocational
education at the high school level, while group 3 includes workers with university education.
3.4 The extent of labour mobility 81
Table 3.5: Within manufacturing mobility: Mean of annual values 1991-2000
Low education Vocational University
Nt % of Nt−1 Nt % of Nt−1 Nt % of Nt−1
Workers in non-MNEs in year t-1, are in year t found in:
Same Plant 65,527 77.3 26,139 80.7 4,351 86.0
Non-MNE 1,681 2.0 983 3.0 141 2.8
Domestic MNE 192 0.2 110 0.3 28 0.6
Foreign MNE 358 0.4 282 0.9 57 1.1
% of Nt−1 in manufacturing 80.0 84.9 90.5
Workers in foreign MNEs in year t-1, are in year t found in:
Same Plant 23,106 78.7 12,241 81.8 3,699 85.4
Foreign MNE 317 1.1 223 1.5 90 2.3
Non-MNE 267 0.9 231 1.5 58 1.3
Domestic MNE 74 0.3 62 0.4 28 0.7
% of Nt−1 in manufacturing 81.0 85.1 89.7
Workers in domestic MNEs in year t-1, are in year t found in:
Same Plant 17,944 80.7 9,278 84.2 2,284 85.0
Domestic MNE 353 1.5 290 2.7 76 2.9
Non-MNE 115 0.6 100 0.9 31 1.1
Foreign MNE 112 0.5 92 0.8 33 1.2
% of Nt−1 in manufacturing 83.3 88.6 90.2
Table 3.5 shows for each of the three groups of plants (non-MNEs, foreign MNEs and
domestic MNEs) where workers that were employed in t-1 are found the following year.
This indicates the size of the mobility flows relative to the size of the plants. Concentrating
on the columns for workers with low education, we see that on average 77.3% of the workers
in non-MNEs with low education are employed in the same plant from one year to the next.
A total of 80% of these workers are still found within manufacturing. The remaining 20%
not accounted for in the table have left manufacturing for jobs in other sectors, are out of
the labour force or unemployed. Mobility is slightly lower in foreign and domestic MNEs
than in non-MNEs, 80.7% of low education workers in domestic MNEs continue in the same
plant from one year to the next. The lower mobility in MNEs is likely to be connected to
the size of the plants, as bigger plants have more of an internal labour market, and also a
lower probability of exit. The lower mobility in domestic MNEs correspond to the longer
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tenure in these plants compared to non-MNEs, as revealed in Table 3.2. Workers with
university education are substantially less mobile than workers with lower education. On
average, around 85% of workers with university education stay in the same plant from one
year to the next. This might indicate that workers with high education accumulate plant
specific human capital to a larger extent than other workers.
Table 3.5 also indicates the presence of ‘internal labour markets’ within the group of
multinational plants, in particular for domestic MNEs. On average 719 workers move from
domestic MNEs to other domestic MNEs each year, while only 246 move from domestic
MNEs to non-MNEs .13 This gives a ratio of almost 3 movers from domestic MNEs to other
domestic MNEs for each mover to a non-MNE. A rather different ratio from the average of
less than 1 worker in domestic MNEs per 3 workers in non-MNEs, which can be calculated
from Table 3.1. Movers from foreign MNEs spread evenly between other foreign MNEs
and non-MNEs, with a ratio of approximately 1.1. Hence, workers in domestic MNEs tend
to move within this group of plants to a much larger extent than their share of workers
would suggest. This tendency is not so pronounced for movers from foreign MNEs.14 One
explanation for this feature is that domestic MNEs are more likely to be part of multi-plant
firms, with workers moving between plants within the firm.
From Table 3.5 we find that on average, each year around 800 workers in MNEs move to
non-MNEs.15 This only accounts for about 1% of the workers in MNEs, cf. Table 3.1. This
may suggest that the potential for knowledge diffusion is small. MNEs are far larger than
non-MNEs, however. The mobility flows from MNEs may therefore look more important
from the perspective of non-MNEs. Table 3.6 shows the percentage of workers in non-
MNEs in 1995 and 2000 with recent experience from MNEs. Recent MNE experience is
defined as having worked in an MNE for one or more of the last three years. Thus, a worker
must have worked in a multinational for one or more of the years 1997-1999 to be counted
as having MNE experience in 2000. In 1995 only 5.9% of the workers in non-MNEs had
experience from MNEs, and this was roughly equally divided between foreign and domestic
MNE experience. In 2000 15.1% of workers in non-MNEs had experience from MNEs, the
majority from foreign MNEs. The percentage of workers with experience from domestic
13From the lower part of Table 3.5 we find 719 by adding 353+290+76 from the row indicating movers
to domestic MNEs, similarly we find 249 by summing along the row of movers to non-MNEs.
14Martins (2006), in his study of foreign to domestic labour mobility in Portugal, finds similar evidence
of ‘internal labour markets’ within the group of foreign firms.
15We reach this number by summing along the row indicating movers from foreign MNEs to non-
MNEs (267+231+58), and by summing along the row of movers from domestic MNEs to non-MNEs
(115+100+31).
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Table 3.6: Workers in non-MNEs with experience from MNEs
All Education
1 2 3
1995
Experience from MNE 5.9 5.2 7.4 7.9
Experience from domestic MNE 2.8 2.3 3.7 4.0
Experience from foreign MNE 3.2 2.9 3.7 4.1
Total workers 113,862 77,422 32,144 4,296
2000
Experience from MNE 15.1 12.4 19.2 22.1
Experience from domestic MNE 6.1 4.9 7.5 9.9
Experience from foreign MNE 10.4 8.4 13.4 15.3
Total workers 107,502 68,959 26,617 11,926
Notes: Numbers in percent. 1 = Non-technical education;
2 = Vocational/technical education; 3 = University degree
and foreign MNEs respectively, do not sum to the percentage of workers with overall MNE
experience (15.1%), because some of the workers may have experience from both types of
MNEs. The largest increase in the incidence of MNE experience has come in the group
of workers with university education. 22.1% of these workers had recent experience from
MNEs in 2000, the majority with experience from foreign MNEs.
Table 3.7 shows the percentage of non-MNEs in 1995 and 2000 that employed workers
with recent experience from MNEs. When comparing Tables 3.6 and 3.7 we see that
although the percentage of workers with recent MNE experience is small, the percentage
of plants employing such workers is much larger, 17.9% in 1995 (against 5.9% of workers)
and 45.2% in 2000 (against 15.1% of workers). While at the individual level, the share of
workers with MNE experience among the university educated in 2000 is larger than for the
other groups, the picture is the opposite at the plant level. The percentage of plants that
employ university educated workers with experience from MNEs is only 14.2% in 2000,
while the share of university educated workers with MNE experience is 22.1%. Hence it is
a rather small subset of non-MNEs that employ workers with university education.
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Table 3.7: Non-MNEs employing workers with MNE experience
All Education
1 2 3
1995
Experience from MNE 17.9 11.6 10.4 3.1
Experience from domestic MNE 8.0 4.6 4.6 1.5
Experience from foreign MNE 12.8 8.2 6.9 1.9
2000
Experience from MNE 45.2 33.3 25.5 14.2
Experience from domestic MNE 24.7 15.6 12.2 6.7
Experience from foreign MNE 37.6 26.3 20.7 10.7
Notes: Numbers in percent. 1 = Non-technical education;
2 = Vocational/technical education; 3 = University degree
3.5 Productivity spillovers through labour mobility?
The evidence presented in Section 3.4 shows relatively small mobility flows. However, in
terms of the potential for mobility to generate spillovers that affect plant productivity,
the interesting issue is how the workers with MNE experience spread across the group of
non-MNEs. The previous section also showed that during the 1990s there was a growing
and fairly substantial percentage of plants that employed workers with previous experience
from MNEs. I now proceed to investigate whether labour mobility gives rise to productivity
effects at the plant level.
The empirical spillover literature surveyed by Görg and Greenaway (2004) has looked for
evidence of productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms by regressing a measure
of domestic plant productivity on a number of covariates, including a measure of foreign
presence in the industry or region. As argued by Görg and Strobl (2005a), this approach
treats the channels through which spillovers may occur as a black box. A measure of
foreign presence at the industry level is not able to capture the fact that firms within
the same industry have different degrees of contact with foreign firms.16 Domestic firms
with explicit contacts with foreign firms may be the most likely to benefit from knowledge
16If foreign presence is measured in the same industry as the domestic plants are located, this measure
picks up intra-industry (also called horizontal-) spillovers (see e.g. Haddad and Harrison ,1993; Aitken and
Harrison, 1999; Keller and Yeaple, 2002; Kinoshita, 2001). Regressions that include foreign presence in
upstream or downstream industries from the domestic plants pick up inter-industry (also called vertical-)
spillovers (Kugler, 2006; Smarzynska-Javorcik, 2004).
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diffusion. Examples of contacts between foreign and domestic firms could, in addition to
labour mobility, be technology licensing, R&D cooperation, or exchange of intermediate
inputs. Unfortunately, information at the firm or plant level on such links between MNEs
and non-MNEs is rarely available.17 Görg and Strobl (2005a) use information on whether
the owners of domestic firms have previous experience from MNEs, and this firm-specific
link between domestic firms and multinationals has a positive effect on the productivity of
domestic firms in their sample of manufacturing firms from Ghana.
With the Norwegian data I am able to construct plant-specific measures for the shares
of workers in non-MNEs with recent experience from MNEs, and I include this measure
in a Cobb-Douglas production function. The interpretation of the coefficient on the share
of workers with MNE experience is based on Griliches (1967). He argues that in a Cobb-
Douglas production function one could ask whether different types of labour are equally
‘potent’ in generating productivity growth.18 I apply this idea to labour with recent ex-
perience from MNEs (LM) and labour without such experience (LN). Under the spillover
hypothesis, we would expect that LM should be weighted by a positive ‘premium’ δ in the
production function. With two types of labour in the production function, effective labour
L∗ is
L∗ = LN + LM(1 + δ) = L(1 + δs),
where s = LM/L is the share of labour with MNE experience in the total use of labour, L =
LN+LM . Given a Cobb-Douglas production function Y = (K)βK (M)βM (L∗)βL , the βL lnL∗
term in its log linearized version can be approximated by βL lnL+βLδs, and we can estimate
the following production function
lnYit = βK lnKit + βM lnMit + βL lnLit + βLδsit + υi + vt + εit. (3.2)
In equation (3.2) lnY , lnK, lnM , and lnL are the natural logs of output, capital, material
and hours in plant i, year t.19 sit is the share of workers that have experience from MNEs,
υi and vt are plant and time fixed effects. When constructing the measures of sit, I require
the MNE experience of workers in non-MNEs to be relatively recent, i.e. for a worker to
be counted as having MNE experience in year t, the worker had to work in a multinational
17Studies that find evidence consistent with spillovers through vertical linkages (e.g. Smarzynska-
Javorcik, 2004) use aggregate input output tables to generate the variables representing the links between
foreign and domestic firms, but these are not firm specific links.
18Griliches (1986) applies this idea to different types of R&D expenditure.
19For variable construction, see the variable definitions in the Appendix.
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for one or more of the years t−3 to t−1.20 Since βL is estimated separately, the combined
βLδ term can be used to compute the δ term.21
Table 3.8 presents results of estimating equation (3.2) with plant fixed effects on the
sample of non-MNEs. 28 industry dummies corresponding to ISIC 3-digit level and year
dummies are added in all regressions. In Column 1, sit is the share of workers in the
plant with recent experience from both foreign and domestic MNEs. The coefficient on the
share of workers with MNE experience is positive and significant. We can calculate the
implied δ from the fixed effect results in Column 1 by combining the estimated coefficient
on labour and the coefficient on the share of workers with MNE experience. The implied
δ for workers with MNE-experience is found at the bottom of Column 1. δ = 0.27, which
means that workers with experience from MNEs contribute on average 27% more to the
total factor productivity of the plant than workers without such experience. The effect
is significant at the 5% level.22 In Column 2, the measure of MNE experience is split
into two parts; the shares of workers with experience from foreign and domestic MNEs,
respectively. In this case both coefficients are positive, but not significant. More than
30% of plants that employ workers with domestic MNE experience also employ workers
with foreign MNE experience, and this makes it difficult to identify the separate effects of
foreign and domestic MNE experience. In Column 3, the workers with MNE experience
are split by education, this time only the small group of university educated individuals
is distinguished from the rest. In this case, only the coefficient on the largest group of
workers with MNE experience, those without university education, is significant.
The way I have constructed the measure for the share of workers with MNE experience
implies that this measure captures the newly hired employees with MNE experience in the
plant, where newly hired means hired in year t, t-1 or t-2. If workers that change plants in
general are better than stayers, the productivity premium found for newly hired workers
20This corresponds to the definition of recent MNE experience used in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 in Section 3.4.
21L is measured as total man-hours in the plant. This variable is from the Manufacturing Statistics.
The share of workers with MNE experience is constructed from the matches between fulltime workers
from the employee data and plants in the Manufacturing Statistics. The use of L together with the
share s means that I assume that the share of matched workers with MNE experience approximates
the share of hours by workers with MNE experience. At the aggregate manufacturing level the match of
individuals to plants generates total manufacturing employment that corresponds to what we would get by
using the employment information from the Manufacturing Statistics. At the plant level, the employment
correspondence is more variable, thus I prefer to use the hours variable from the Manufacturing Statistics
in the production function rather than constructing labour input from the number of individuals that I
match to the plant level data.
22Including the interaction of year dummies and 9 2-digit industry dummies does not change the direction
of the result in Column 1. The implied δ falls to 23%, but is significant at the 5% level.
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Table 3.8: Share of workers with MNE experience and plant productivity
Dependent variable: Log(Output)
1 2 3 4
Share of workers with MNE-exp. .096∗ .099∗∗
(.037) (.037)
Share of workers with foregin MNE-exp. .069
(.037)
Share of workers with domestic MNE-exp. .115
(.078)
Share with MNE-exp. and low education .100∗∗
(.038)
Share with MNE-exp. and high education .038
(.175)
Share of new workers without MNE-exp. .027
(.014)
Log(Capital) .053∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗ .053∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Log(Materials) .507∗∗∗ .507∗∗∗ .507∗∗∗ .507∗∗∗
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Log(Hours) .355∗∗∗ .355∗∗∗ .355∗∗∗ .354∗∗∗
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
N 33,405 33,405 33,405 33,405
R-sq .83 .83 .83 .83
δ (MNE-exp.) .270∗ .280∗∗
(.107) (.107)
δ (without MNE-exp.) .076
(.040)
Notes: All regressions include year dummies and 28 industry dummies. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗=
significant at 0.1, 1 and 5%, respectively. Standard errors clustered on plants in paren-
theses.
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with MNE experience may also apply to other newly hired workers. In Column 4 of Table
3.8 I check whether the productivity premium found for workers with MNE experience is
an effect of newly hired workers in general being more productive than workers who have
been longer in the plant. I do this by repeating Column 1 with the addition of a measure
for the share of newly hired workers without MNE experience. The result clearly shows
that there is a difference in the productivity premium connected with newly hired workers,
depending on whether they do, or do not have, MNE-experience. The result for newly
hired workers with MNE experience is more or less the same as in Column 1, with an
implied productivity premium of 28%. In contrast, the implied productivity premium for
newly hired workers without MNE experience is around 7%, and only significant at the
10% level.
I have also estimated equation (3.2) by dropping 2-digit sectors one by one. The
estimated coefficient on the share of workers with MNE experience is in all cases of the
same order of magnitude as in Column 1 of Table 3.8. It is also significant at the 5% level
in all cases except when I drop the machinery and equipment industry. In that case the
coefficient on the share of workers with MNE experience is significant at the 10% level.
This suggests that the spillover effect from labour mobility is particularly strong in the
Norwegian machinery and equipment sector. This is the largest manufacturing sector in
Norway and employs around 35% of all manufacturing workers.
Table 3.9 includes the results for the estimated coefficient on the share of workers with
MNE experience (cf. Column 1 of Table 3.8) from a number of different robustness checks.
All regressions are estimated using the fixed effects (within effects) method. The first
six rows of Table 3.9 repeat different variations of the regression presented in Column 1 of
Table 3.8. The first two rows add control variables that are commonly used in the empirical
literature on spillovers from FDI. These include foreign presence measured as the share of
employment in foreign firms at the 5-digit industry level in Row 1, and variables to control
for industry competition in Row 2.23 In Row 3 I control for turnover and skill share at the
plant level, since the hiring of workers with MNE experience could be systematically related
to these variables. An alternative way to control for human capital is to replace the hours
variable with a better measure of human capital at the plant level. I do this by multiplying
hours with the average education level of the plant, and present the result in Row 4 of
Table 3.9. As the result in Table 3.8 implies decreasing returns to scale, the regression in
23The competition variables were first proposed by Nickell (1996) and include market shares, profit
margins, industry concentration and a measure of import competition. See variable definitions in Chapter
2.
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Row 5 of Table 3.9 imposes constant returns to scale in the production function. In this
case the coefficient on the share of workers with MNE experience is reduced, but is still
significant at the 10% level. The implied δ in the constant returns to scale estimation is
0.18; also significant at the 10% level. In Row 6 I use the lagged share of workers with MNE
experience instead of the current share when estimating equation (3.2). This is to account
for the likely possibility that the effect of the new workers on productivity may take time
to materialise. When comparing Column 1 of Table 3.8 and the first six rows of Table
3.9, we see that the result is not affected by these alternative specifications. In all cases
the coefficient on the share of workers with MNE experience is positive and significant and
implies a productivity premium of 24 to 28%. The exception is the regression imposing
constant returns to scale in the production function, but even here the result is significant
at the 10% level and implies a productivity premium for workers with MNE experience of
almost 20% compared to workers without such experience.
Table 3.9: Robustness: Estimated coefficient on share of workers with MNE experience
MNE-exp. N R-Sq δ
1. Industry level of foreign presence .096∗ (.037) 33,405 .83 .27∗ [.011]
2. Competition variables .1∗∗ (.037) 33,405 .83 .28∗∗ [.008]
3. Plant level skillshare and turnover .093∗ (.037) 33,405 .83 .26∗ [.014]
4. Plant level human capital .082∗ (.038) 33,387 .83 .24∗ [.033]
5. Impose constant returns to scale .072 (.038) 33,405 .89 .18 [.062]
6. Lagged share of MNE-exp .089∗ (.035) 25,619 .81 .25∗ [.011]
7. 3-digit industry input coefficients .086∗∗ (.031) 33,405 .85
8. Dummy for MNE-exp .015∗∗∗ (.003) 33,405 .83
9. TFP as dependent variable .308∗∗∗ (.059) 33,405 .07
10. Levinsohn-Petrin residuals .077∗ (.033) 28,777 .05
11. Labour productivity .2∗ (.085) 33,405 .04
Notes: Rows 1-6 are different variations of the regression in Column 1 of Table 3.8 where the
dependent variable is log(output). Log(output) is also dependent variable in Rows 7-8, but δ cannot
be calculated. In Rows 9-11 the dependent variables are different productivity measures which are
regressed on the share of workers with MNE experience, year and industry dummies. Standard errors
in round brackets, P-values in square brackets. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗= significant at 0.1, 1 and 5%, respectively.
Rows 7-11 of Table 3.9 includes regressions that differ from the specification in equation
(3.2), thus we cannot calculate the implied productivity premium for workers with MNE
experience, but only estimate the effect of the share of workers with MNE experience
in an augmented production function framework. Row 7 reports the result of a more
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general specification of the production function in equation (3.2) where the coefficients on
capital, materials and hours are allowed to vary across 3-digit industries. In Row 8 of
Table 3.9 the share of workers with MNE experience is replaced with a dummy equal to
one if the plant employs one or more workers with MNE experience. This departs from
the assumed linear relationship between the share of workers with MNE experience and
plant level productivity that is implicit in equation (3.2). The estimated coefficient on
the dummy is positive and significant at the 0.1% level.24 In the last three rows of Table
3.9, I regress three different measures of plant level productivity on the share of workers
with MNE experience while including year and industry dummies. The TFP-index used
in Row 9 is described in the Appendix. In Row 10 I use the residuals from estimating a
Cobb-Douglas production function at the 2-digit industry level according to the method
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The method is developed in order to address the
simultaneity problem in estimates of production functions.25 The last row of Table 3.9 uses
labour productivity measured as the log of output per hour as the dependent variable. In
Rows 9-11, the results point in the same direction as before; the estimated coefficients on
the share of workers with MNE experience are positive and significant. Thus the positive
effect of MNE experience on plant level productivity is robust to several different measures
of productivity.
To summarize, the estimation results suggest that workers with MNE experience con-
tribute in the order of 20-25% more to the productivity of their plants than their colleagues
without such experience. The mean share of workers with recent MNE experience is 7.7%
for those non-MNEs that have workers with MNE experience, evaluated at the mean, these
plants have 1.5-2% higher TFP than plants that have not recruited workers with MNE ex-
perience. The productivity premium attributed to workers with MNE experience is not
associated with newly hired workers in general, as we do not find a similar productivity
effect for newly hired workers without MNE experience.
24The robustness checks in Rows 1-7 of Table 3.9 would all give a positive and significant coefficient at
the 1 or 0.1% level if the share of workers with MNE experience is replaced by a dummy variable as in
Row 8.
25An alternative method to control both for unobserved plant fixed effects and input simultaneity is to
use the GMM-System estimator recently developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For a recent application
to the question of whether foreign-owned firms are more productive than domestic firms, see Benfratello
and Sembenelli (2006). I have tried variations of the GMM-System estimator using different lags of inputs
and output as instruments. In all cases the validity of the instrument set was rejected.
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3.6 Do workers benefit from mobility?
The results of the previous section indicated that workers with experience from MNEs
are very important for the productivity of non-MNEs, and as such we would expect these
workers to be rewarded in their new plants. The potential process of spillovers through
labour mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs is similar to the process of R&D spillovers
through labour mobility. The literature on R&D spillovers and labour mobility uses a
human capital framework and focuses in particular on the relationship between mobility
and wages. Since at least part of the knowledge acquired in a firm will move with the
worker in the case of mobility, workers that get access to training/knowledge should be
willing to pay for this by accepting a current pay cut in expectation of future private
returns (Pakes and Nitzan, 1983).26
Table 3.10 shows mean wage growth in percent from the year before moving to the
year after moving for different groups of movers. Their wage growth is also compared to
the mean annual wage growth of workers who never change plant (stayers). The average
wage growth of stayers is around 3% per year, while the movers experience wage growth
of more than 5% upon moving from their old plant to a new one. Workers that change
from a MNE to a non-MNE experience on average a wage growth of 7.2%, while the wage
growth for movers in the opposite direction is 8.1%. These growth rates are higher than
for workers that change plants within the group of MNEs or non-MNEs (5.6 and 5.7%).27
The difference between average wage growth in the year of moving compared to annual
average wage growth in the sample indicates that most job changes are voluntary, and
that the movers increase their wage as a result of moving. This is consistent with the view
that workers are attracted to their new plants by a deliberate policy by the hiring plant to
acquire new workers to get access to their knowledge. It is also consistent with the view
that the moving workers are earning a private return on general training received by the
previous employer, and that this return is larger with a new employer who has not paid
any of the training costs (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999).
In Table 3.10 the wage growth for MNE to non-MNE movers and for non-MNE to
MNE movers is very similar. In fact, the movers from non-MNEs to MNEs experience
26I find no evidence that workers in MNEs pay for the knowledge they accumulate on the job through
lower wages early in their career. Møen (2005) finds the opposite result for technical staff in R&D-intensive
firms in the Norwegian machinery and equipment industry.
27Martins (2006) and Pesola (2006) investigate the private returns to mobility from foreign to domestic
firms in Portugal and Finland, respectively. In Portugal foreign to domestic movers on average experience
a pay cut upon moving, while the opposite is the case in Finland.
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Table 3.10: Characteristics of movers and stayers
Movers from MNEs Movers from non-MNEs Stayers
non-MNEs MNEs non-MNE MNE non-MNEs MNEs
Wage before move 24,967 26,161 23,275 24,336 23,228 25,606
Wage after move 26,023 27,086 23,872 25,439 23,156 25,728
Wagechange % 7.2 5.5 5.8 8.1 3.0 3.3
Tenure 4.3 6.4 4.6 4.0 8.6 9.1
Age 35.0 37.9 36.4 35.2 41.1 40.8
Education 11.2 11.2 10.7 11.0 10.4 10.9
N 6,744 15,206 22,836 8,556 559,459 310,050
on average a larger wage jump than movers in the other direction.28 As the wage growth
numbers in Table 3.10 are unconditional means, they may be systematically affected by
the characteristics of the movers or the plants they move between. For instance, when
interpreting the wage growth of 8.1% for movers from non-MNEs to MNEs, we must bear
in mind that most of these moves mean that the worker moves from a small plant to a larger
plant (as the average size of MNEs is much larger than for non-MNEs). And since wages
are positively correlated with plant size, the change in plant size may be an important
factor in explaining the wage growth for non-MNE to MNE movers.
In order to investigate further the extent to which the movers may be selected out of
their old plants and into their new plants, I follow the approach of Martins (2006). He
compares the wages of foreign to domestic movers to the wages of their colleagues that do
not move plants. He does this both before and after moving by estimating the following
wage regression
wijt = β0 + β1DMij + β2DNij +X
′
ijtβ3 + F
′
jtβ4 + dj + eit. (3.3)
wijt is the log real wage of worker i employed in firm j at time t, Xijt is a vector of
observable individual characteristics, Fjt is a vector of observable plant characteristics, dj
is a plant fixed effect, while eit is an idiosyncratic error term.
When comparing the wages of movers from MNEs before moving to wages of stayers in
MNEs, DMij is a dummy equal to 1 if worker i of plant j moves to a MNE in the future,
28One possible explanation is that the MNEs may be actively seeking to attract good workers from
non-MNEs as a form of technology sourcing.
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while DNij equals 1 if the worker moves to a non-MNE in the future.29 The results,
presented in the first two columns of Table 3.11, indicate that future movers to non-MNEs,
are paid no differently than their fellow workers who will stay in the plant. By contrast,
workers who move to other MNEs in the future earn a premium of about 1,5%. There is
no difference in the results from OLS and fixed effects between Columns 1 and 2. The lack
of difference between the OLS and fixed effect results indicates that the wage premium for
movers from MNEs to other MNEs is not caused by these movers coming from high-wage
MNEs.
Table 3.11: Before moving: Wages of movers vs stayers in old plant
Movers from MNEs Movers from non-MNEs
Movers to non-MNEs -.006 .000 .003 -.003
(.004) (.004) (.002) (.003)
Movers to MNEs .015∗ .015∗ .029∗ .012∗
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.004)
N 335,017 335,017 581,784 581,784
R-sq. .42 .48 .34 .48
OLS Plant-FE OLS Plant-FE
Notes: Regressions include year and 28 industry dummies. Variables for plant and indi-
vidual characteristics are the same as indicated in the note to Table 3.3. ∗= significant
at 1 percent level. Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses.
I next use equation (3.3) to compare the wages of movers from non-MNEs before mov-
ing to wages of stayers in non-MNEs, and the results are presented in the last two columns
of Table 3.11. Movers from non-MNEs to other non-MNEs are not paid differently from
their fellow workers before moving, while movers from non-MNEs to MNEs receive a wage
premium compared to stayers in non-MNEs. This wage premium is 2.9% with OLS es-
timation, but falls to 1,2% when taking account of plant fixed effects, thus part of the
wage premium found with OLS estimation is due to MNEs recruiting from high-wage local
plants.30 In terms of the potential for knowledge diffusion, the evidence of a wage pre-
29Martins (2006) only considers movers from foreign to domestic firms and therefore uses only one
dummy.
30 All regressions in Table 3.11 require the movers to be observed in their old plant 3 years before moving,
and the appropriate dummy applies for all these three years. (Similar results are obtained if the dummy
only applies the last year before moving.) In addition, I only include movers that are observed moving in
the indicated direction once during the period 1990-2000. For the stayers, I include only individuals that
never change plant within manufacturing, and require that they are observed at least 5 years. Thus the
wage regressions compare movers that were ‘relatively stable’ before moving to stayers that are ‘relatively
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mium for future movers from non-MNEs to MNEs points more in the direction of MNEs
being better placed to benefit from mobility spillovers, since they are able to select better
workers.
Table 3.12: After moving: Wages of movers vs stayers in new plant
Movers to non-MNEs Movers to MNEs
Tenure from:
MNE, <1 y. .026∗ .010 -.010 -.009
(.007) (.006) (.006) (.006)
MNE, ∈(1,3 y.) .048∗ .038∗ .028∗ .028∗
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
MNE, >3 y. .059∗ .048∗ .051∗ .036∗
(.005) (.006) (.004) (.005)
Non-MNE, <1 y. .009 -.007 -.019∗ -.021∗
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.005)
Non-MNE, ∈(1,3 y.) .030* .014* -.001 .003
(.004) (.004) (.006) (.006)
Non-MNE, >3 y. .026∗ .020∗ -.027∗ -.01
(.003) (.003) (.005) (.006)
N 592,856 592,856 345,725 345,725
R-sq. .34 .47 .42 .49
OLS Plant-FE OLS Plant-FE
Notes: Regressions include year and 28 industry dummies. Variables for plant
and individual characteristics are the same as indicated in the note to Table
3.3. ∗= significant at 1 percent level. Standard errors clustered on individuals
in parentheses.
So far we have only seen how the movers were doing before moving, but movers may
be well paid relative to similar workers in their new plants, even though they may not
seem particularly selected from (or well-paid in) their old plants. I investigate this using
equation (3.3), but this time comparing wages of the movers after moving to wages of
stayers in the plants they are moving to. In these regressions I account for the length of
tenure in the plant prior to moving by replacing the dummy DMij in equation (3.3) with
three dummies; the first equal to 1 if tenure in the MNE prior to moving is less than 1
year, the second capturing tenure of 1-3 years, and the third for workers with more than
3 years of tenure in the MNE before moving. Similarly, the dummy DNij is replaced by
stable’.
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three dummies to capture the length of tenure in the non-MNE before moving.
The first two columns of Table 3.12 report the results for movers to non-MNEs.31 In the
OLS results in Column 1, movers from MNEs to non-MNEs earn a wage premium relative
to the stayers in non-MNEs, and the wage premium increases with the length of tenure
from the MNE. In the fixed effect results of Column 2 there is no significant wage premium
for movers to non-MNEs with less than 1 year of tenure from the MNE prior to moving,
while the wage premium is 4.7% for workers with more than 3 years of tenure from the
MNE.32 This wage premium is more than double that of movers from other non-MNEs.
Thus, even though the results in Table 3.11 indicated no particular selection of workers
from MNEs to non-MNEs, these movers are clearly doing better than their colleagues in
their new plant.33 Results for movers to MNEs are presented in the last two columns of
Table 3.12. For movers from non-MNEs to MNEs, no length of tenure in a non-MNE gives
an additional premium over and above tenure and experience in general. Thus, while the
results in Table 3.11 indicated that these workers are selected out of the non-MNEs, they
are not doing better than similar workers in their new plants. The evidence on the wages
of movers from non-MNEs to MNEs is not consistent with a potential for spillovers from
non-MNEs to MNEs, as there is no extra effect of prior experience in non-MNEs on the
earnings of movers to MNEs.
3.7 Conclusions
The evidence provided in this chapter is consistent with labour mobility from MNEs to
non-MNEs working as a channel for spillovers. First, as MNEs pay higher wages than
non-MNEs, this suggests that MNEs have a firm-specific advantage, and hence that there
is a potential for spillovers. Second, during the 1990s an increasing share of non-MNEs
employ workers with previous experience fromMNEs. Third, workers with MNE experience
contribute substantially to the productivity of their new plants. According to the estimates
here, workers with MNE experience contribute 20-25% more to the productivity of non-
MNEs than workers without such experience. Thus, mobility is clearly a channel for
31In a similar way as for the results in Table 3.11, the wage regressions presented in Table 3.12 are
comparing movers that are ‘relatively stable’ after moving to stayers that are ‘relatively stable’. See
Footnote 30.
32The results in both Tables 3.11 and 3.12 are unaffected by the inclusion of interaction terms between
year and 2-digit industry dummies.
33Similarly, Martins (2006) and Pesola (2006) find that previous tenure from foreign plants pays off after
moving to domestic plants.
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knowledge diffusion in Norwegian manufacturing. Fourth, it is in particular workers moving
from MNEs to non-MNEs that are rewarded in terms of higher wages in their new plants.
This private return to mobility is an indication that the hiring plants value the knowledge
these workers bring with them, and it is consistent with the productivity effects found at
the plant level.
It could be argued that the productivity premium found for workers with MNE ex-
perience is not a result of knowledge diffusion from MNEs to non-MNEs, but merely a
result of better selection of workers. If MNEs are better in selecting workers to their plants
than non-MNEs, the non-MNEs could use previous MNE experience as a screening device
when hiring new workers. As a result, even if new workers in non-MNEs with recent MNE
experience learnt nothing while employed in MNEs, the possible selection effect may be
sufficient to generate a productivity premium associated with these workers. The pure
selection argument implies that length of tenure in the MNE should not be important for
the wage premium received by workers moving from MNEs to non-MNEs. The evidence
provided in Table 3.12 indicates that length of tenure from MNEs does have an effect on
the wage premium. This is not consistent with a pure selection effect, but is consistent
with learning over time in MNEs and knowledge diffusion through labour mobility from
MNEs to non-MNEs.
The wage premium for movers from MNEs to non-MNEs with more than 3 years of
experience from MNEs is almost 5% compared to stayers in non-MNEs with similar char-
acteristics. This 5% wage premium is far less than the 20-25% productivity premium these
workers have relative to workers without MNE experience in non-MNEs. The difference be-
tween the wage premium and the productivity effect suggests that the hiring non-MNEs do
not fully pay for the value of the workers to the firm, and thus labour mobility from MNEs
to non-MNEs seems to be a source of knowledge externality in Norwegian manufacturing.
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Definition of variables used in the production function: Equation (3.2) in Section 3.5.
Lit Number of person hours in the plant. Rented labour hours are calculated from the
costs of rented labour using the calculated average wage for own employees. Since
only blue-collar hours are reported prior to 1983, and only total hours from 1983,
total hours before 1983 are estimated by using information on the blue-collar share
of the total wage bill.
Kit The estimate of capital services uses the following aggregation:
Kit = Rit + (0.07 + δ
m)V mit + (0.07 + δ
b)V bit,
where Rit is the cost of rented capital in the plant, V mit and V bit are the estimated
values of machinery and buildings at the beginning of the year, δm = 0.06 and
δb = 0.02 are the depreciation rates. The rate of return to capital is taken to be 0.07.
The values for depreciation rates and the rate of return to capital are also used by
Salvanes and Førre (2003) using the same data. The estimated values of buildings
and machinery are obtained from information on fire insurance values. To reduce
noise and avoid discarding too many observations with missing fire insurance values,
these values are smoothed using the perpetual inventory method. Fire insurance
values are not recorded after 1995, thus from 1996 capital values are estimated by
adding investments and taking account of depreciation. Where possible, I also use
estimates of firm level capital values (distributed to the plant level according to
employment shares) as starting values for plants with entry after 1995. These capital
values are obtained from recent work to improve on capital estimates in Norwegian
manufacturing, see Raknerud et al. (2003). Separate price deflators for inputs and
output and for investment in buildings and machinery are obtained from Statistics
Norway. The aggregation level for the price deflators is according to the sector
classification used in the National Accounts, which is somewhere in between the 2-
and 3-digit ISIC level.
Mit Total cost of materials used. Since this variable in the data includes rented labour
and capital, I subtract these and allocate them to the labour and capital measures
respectively.
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Yit Gross production value net of sales taxes and subsidies.
The total factor productivity (TFP) index used in Row 9 of Table 3.9 is calculated at
the plant level as
lnTFPit = lnYit − αKt lnKit − αLt lnLit − αMt lnMit, (3.4)
where the αzt ’s are the 5-digit means of cost shares of each factor z relative to output Yit.
Chapter 4
The contribution of foreign entrants to
employment and productivity growth
- joint with Stefanie A. Haller∗
Abstract
We compare employment and productivity dynamics in foreign and domestic
entrants, exitors, survivors and acquisitions in Norwegian manufacturing from
1979 to 2000. On average all types of foreign plants are more productive than
their domestic counterparts. There is more gross job reallocation in domestic
than in foreign plants. Contrary to common beliefs, foreign owners do not
acquire highly productive domestic plants in order to lay off their employees.
Instead they tend to reverse a negative trend in productivity and employment
in the acquired plants. Moreover, during the 1992-97 expansion all foreign
plants taken together accounted for 61% of productivity growth with a market
share of only 38%.
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4.1 Introduction
It is recognised that the presence of foreign firms in a host country may affect the perfor-
mance of domestic firms indirectly through knowledge spillovers, for a survey see Görg and
Greenaway (2004). However, the direct effect which foreign entry has of bringing about
a change in the composition of firms in the host country is less studied. As foreign firms
tend to be larger and more productive than domestic firms1, a rise in the share of foreign
firms in a host country may increase aggregate productivity even without any spillovers
taking place. At the same time, foreign firms also become actors in the local input markets.
While they may not rely on the local capital market and intermediate input markets to
the same extent as domestic firms, they usually source labour locally. On the one hand,
this may increase demand for labour if foreign entrepreneurs set up new plants. On the
other hand, however, foreign acquisitions are often associated with the fear of job loss as
the new owners are expected to review and reorganise existing structures under efficiency
considerations. Moreover, jobs in foreign-owned plants are frequently perceived to be less
secure as it may be easier for multinational companies than for purely domestic firms to
shift production or other activities between locations in different countries.2
Our goal in this chapter is to examine to what extent productivity and employment
dynamics go hand in hand in the Norwegian manufacturing sector between 1979 and 2000.
We distinguish between domestic and foreign exitors, survivors and entrants and focus in
particular on foreign entry by acquisition. Our analysis employs tools from two literatures
and extends them to include foreign acquisitions and divestures. We look at job reallocation
using the methodology pioneered by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). Their approach counts
jobs created and jobs destroyed separately, and also accounts for the role of entry in
job creation and the role of exit in job destruction. We examine productivity dynamics
using the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition. This method attributes the contributions to
productivity growth to surviving, entering and exiting firms.
Distinguishing between foreign and domestic firms in productivity decompositions has
confirmed that the contribution of foreign firms to aggregate productivity growth is sub-
stantial (Okamoto and Sjöholm (2005) for Indonesia, De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) for
1See Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) for a survey of the empirical evidence on the performance of
foreign versus domestic firms in a host country.
2Fabbri et al. (2003) investigate how the increase in multinational presence in the US and the UK
affects labour demand elasticities, based on the argument that global production networks make it easier
to transfer production activities across borders. They find an increase in demand elasticities for less-skilled
labour parallel with an increase in multinational activity in these countries.
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Belgium and Altomonte and Colantone (2005) for Romania). The productivity-employment-
link for foreign and domestic firms, in contrast, has not yet received much attention. Baily
et al. (1994) look at the connection between changes in labour productivity and employ-
ment levels in US manufacturing plants during the 1980s. De Loecker and Konings (2004)
combine productivity decomposition and employment reallocation methods to examine the
net entry process in Slovenia during the transition from a socialist to a market economy.
These studies do not distinguish between foreign and domestic plants. Görg and Strobl
(2005b) study employment dynamics in foreign and domestic firms in Ireland, but do not
consider the connection to productivity. In addition, they do not account for foreign ac-
quisitions, as most of the foreign entry in Ireland has come through greenfield entry.
As acquisition is the main mode of foreign entry into Norwegian manufacturing, we
focus on acquired plants as a separate group in our analysis. This is an interesting exercise
because productivity and employment dynamics are likely to develop quite differently in
the two types of foreign entrants. While both greenfield and acquisition entrants would be
associated with higher levels of productivity than domestic entrants at the time of entry,
their employment and productivity growth dynamics may evolve differently. Greenfield
entrants will contribute positively to productivity growth just by entering, moreover net
job creation is likely to be positive in the first year or two. For foreign acquirers, in
contrast, it may take time to transfer a productivity advantage to the local target firm and
this process may be associated with job losses.
We find that on average all types of foreign plants have higher levels of productivity
than their domestic counterparts. On the contrary, gross job reallocation is lower in foreign
plants. Foreign entrants perform better than domestic entrants the first four years after
entry in terms of both productivity levels and productivity growth. In line with results from
other countries, we find that most of the productivity growth in Norwegian manufacturing
is generated within surviving plants, both domestic and foreign, with foreign survivors
having higher productivity growth than domestic survivors. Our results show that the
contribution to productivity growth from foreign plants increased by more than the market
share of foreign plants from the expansion period during the 1980s (1982-1987) to the next
expansion period from 1992 to 1997. The market share of foreign plants increased from 8%
in 1982-1987 to 38% in the period 1992-1997, while the total share of productivity growth
attributed to foreign plants increased from 6% in 82-87 to 61% in 92-97. The process of
entry and exit of plants accounted for around 10% of productivity growth in both periods,
while at the same time causing net job destruction, primarily due to domestic exitors.
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Almost half the growth contribution from foreign plants in 1992-97 stems from plants
acquired by foreign owners during this period. This is surprising, given that our analysis
shows that in the two years prior to a foreign takeover, the domestic plants concerned
have on average negative productivity growth and are less productive than other domestic
surviving plants. On average these plants also reduce employment before foreign takeover.
For the average acquired plant this process is reversed in the year of the ownership change
and continues for the next two years. Thus, our analysis suggests that foreign owners do
not acquire highly productive domestic plants in order to strip their assets and lay off their
employees, but rather turn domestic plants of average performance into highly successful
plants in terms of both productivity growth and employment creation.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe data
sources and define entry, exit and foreign ownership. This section also gives an overview
of the development of foreign ownership and foreign entry in Norwegian manufacturing.
Section 4.3 gives an overview of productivity and employment dynamics in domestic and
foreign entering, exiting, surviving and acquired plants over the two decades. It also
examines the plants’ performance around crucial events such as acquisitions, entry and
exit. Section 4.4 presents the decomposition of total factor productivity growth into the
contributions from foreign and domestic entrants, survivors and exitors. In addition, it
compares the contributions of the different groups of plants to productivity growth and
employment creation. Section 4.5 briefly concludes.
4.2 Data
Our main data source is the annual census of all Norwegian manufacturing plants collected
by Statistics Norway. The Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics are collected at the plant
level, where the plant is defined as a functional unit at a single physical location, engaged
mainly in activities within a specific activity group. The plant-level variables include
detailed information on production, input use, location, and industry classification.3
Plants are classified into three ownership classes; plants that are part of firms where
less than 20%, between 20-50%, or more than 50% of equity is foreign owned. Before 1990
only direct foreign ownership is recorded, while from 1990 onwards also indirect foreign
3For more detailed descriptions of the Manufacturing Statistics, see the documentation in Halvorsen et
al. (1991) and Møen (2004).
4.2 Data 103
ownership is documented.4 We classify plants as foreign owned when either direct or
indirect foreign ownership of equity is above the 20% threshold. As the indirectly foreign-
owned plants are more similar to the directly foreign-owned plants than to the domestic
plants in terms of mean size, we prefer to include them with the foreign-owned plants.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the development of foreign ownership in our sample. It shows a
dramatic increase in foreign presence during the 1990s, which is a combination of a trend
increase in foreign ownership as well as a result of the extended definition and recording of
foreign ownership. The extended definition of foreign ownership after 1990 means that the
share of foreign ownership during the 1980s and early 1990s is underestimated and, hence,
also the role of foreign plants in productivity and employment dynamics. It is difficult to
assess the extent of underestimation, as the role of indirect ownership relative to direct
ownership also increased during the 1990s.
Figure 4.1: Foreign presence in Norwegian manufacturing
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The extent of foreign ownership in Norway is comparable to, if not larger than, in
neighbouring Sweden and Finland. In Swedish manufacturing the share of employment in
4The foreign ownership variables are obtained from the SIFON register; a register of foreign ownership
interests in Norway. For further details see Chapter 2. A firm has direct foreign ownership interests if
foreigners own part of the equity of the firm. If 50% or more of equity in a plant is owned by another firm
based in Norway (mother), and the mother is foreign-owned, this is defined as indirect foreign ownership
in the SIFON-register.
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foreign-owned firms increased from 17% in 1990 to 27% in 2000 (Karpathy and Lundberg,
2004), while Finland saw an increase from 6% to 22% in the same period (Huttunen, 2005).
It is not clear whether the definitions of foreign ownership in the mentioned studies include
indirect foreign ownership. The share of employment in foreign-owned firms in Norwegian
manufacturing increased from 13 % in 1990 to 38 % in 2000; when excluding indirect
foreign ownership the respective shares are 9 % and 16 %.
In the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics each plant is assigned an identification num-
ber which it keeps throughout its life. A plant keeps its previous identification number
even when it re-enters the market after a time of inactivity as long as production restarts in
the same geographic location. Mergers or buy-outs at the firm level do not affect the plant
identification code. Since our data are from a census, we avoid the problem of possible
false entries and exits due to plants not being sampled.
When defining entry and exit our main concern is the treatment of plants that are
present in the panel for one or more years and then absent for some years before they
reappear in the panel again. Although the logic of the census would imply that a plant
is not in operation if it is not observed in the census, we assume that when a plant is
missing from the census for one or two consecutive years, this is due to lack of registration
rather than a temporary closure. When a plant disappears for three or more consecutive
years before it reappears in the census, we regard it as temporarily closed and thus count
an extra exit and entry for that plant. We also define as temporarily closed those plants
that are missing for two consecutive years, but reappear with a new owner (a new firm
identification number). Thus we define a plant as an entrant in year t if it appears for
the first time in year t, or reappears in that year after a temporary closure. Similarly we
define an exit in year t if the plant is present in year t and temporarily closed in t+ 1, or
absent all subsequent years.5 Plants that in year t have foreign ownership of equity above
20%, while this was below 20% in year t−k are called foreign acquisitions. Instead, foreign
divestures are those plants with a decrease in foreign ownership from above 20% in t − k
to below 20% in year t.
Plants with less than 8 employees throughout their lives, and observations of plants
not in ordinary production (service units or plants under construction) are excluded from
the analysis.6 Further, we drop plants with missing information on inputs or output for
5Less than 2.5% of the plants in the sample have what we define as temporary closures.
6In addition, we drop plants that in the Norwegian Manufacturing statistics are classified as ‘small’
(defined as having less than 5 or 10 employees) throughout their life. The information for these plants
comes mainly from administrative registers and is therefore less extensive than for large plants.
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Table 4.1: Total employment, plant size and plant numbers by ownership
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Mean
Total empl domestic 293,450 266,345 215,665 163,443 140,272 216,951
Total empl foreign 35,528 22,119 32,932 74,323 87,006 50,593
Mean size domestic 42.4 39.9 36.3 33.1 33.1 36.6
Mean size foreign 145.6 96.2 101.0 120.2 112.0 114.7
Domestic plants 6,925 6,681 5,936 4,949 4,243 5,839
Foreign plants 244 230 326 618 777 437
of which
-Domestic entry 153 185 174 143 9 157
-Foreign entry 7 1 12 13 1 10
-Domestic exit 169 232 304 251 173 247
-Foreign exit 4 4 13 24 19 16
-Foreign divesture 24 16 36 63 7 27
-Foreign acquisition 14 23 63 59 35 57
80% or more of their life. Our resulting sample contains 138 000 observations from 10,200
plants. The cleaning procedure has only minor effects on average plant size, the share of
foreign plants and industry composition.
Table 4.1 shows the number of foreign and domestic manufacturing plants in our sample
for 5-year intervals. Over the period the number of foreign plants more than triples while
domestic plants are reduced in numbers. Foreign firms have on average 3-4 times as many
employees as domestic firms. While total employment in foreign-owned plants has more
than doubled, employment in domestic plants in 2000 is about half of that in 1980. The
lower part of Table 4.1 shows the total number of foreign and domestic entrants each year
as well as the number of acquisitions. Acquisition is the main mode of foreign entry into
Norwegian manufacturing, with an annual average of 57 acquisitions against 10 greenfield
entries per year.
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4.3 Evolution of employment and productivity
4.3.1 Employment
In order to get an overview of the possible differences with respect to job creation and job
destruction between domestic and foreign plants, we look at employment dynamics over the
period from 1979 to 2000. We measure job flows following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
Job creation at time t equals employment gains summed over all plants that expand or
start up between t−1 and t, with ∆N+it representing the plant level employment gain from
t − 1 to t. Similarly, job destruction at time t equals employment losses summed over all
plants that contract or exit between t − 1 and t, with ∆N−it representing the plant level
employment loss from t− 1 to t. The sum of job creation and job destruction is referred to
as gross job reallocation, while the difference gives net employment creation. In order to
obtain job creation and job destruction rates, we divide by the size of the group, defined
as the average of employment in t− 1 and t. We consider foreign and domestic survivors,
foreign acquisitions and foreign divestures as separate groups. Hence, job creation and
destruction rates for group h at time t can be written as
JCht =
∑
i²Iht
∆N+it
Nht
and JDht =
∑
i²Iht
∆N−it
Nht
,
where I is the set of plants in group h at time t, and group size is Nht = (
∑
i²Iht
Nit +∑
j²Ih,t−1 Nj,t−1)/2.
Table 4.2 presents annual job creation and destruction rates for different groups of
foreign and domestic plants. The job creation and job destruction rates include the contri-
butions from entry and exit, respectively. We also report the contribution to job creation
by domestic and foreign entrants and the contribution to job destruction by domestic and
foreign exit separately. The columns for foreign acquisitions and foreign divestures show
job creation and job destruction rates in the year of the ownership change. Overall, the
job creation and destruction rates for domestic plants in Table 4.2 are very similar to what
Klette and Mathiassen (1996) found when using the entire Norwegian manufacturing cen-
sus from 1977 to 1986.7 This suggests that leaving out the very small plants as we have
done does not affect the job reallocation rates much. Gross job reallocation in Norwegian
7A related study on job reallocation in Norway is by Salvanes and Førre (2003) who use linked employer-
employee data to provide evidence on job creation and destruction for different educational groups in
Norwegian manufacturing. In addition, Salvanes (1997) looks at the impact of product and labour market
rigidities on job reallocation rates comparing seven OECD countries, including Norway and the US.
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manufacturing is somewhat lower than what Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) find for US
manufacturing. In line with previous studies of job reallocation (e.g. Davis and Halti-
wanger, 1999), there is a clear business cycle component to gross job reallocation: during
the downturn of the economy between 1989 and 1992, job destruction rates in all types of
plants are substantially above average.
Table 4.2 reveals some differences between foreign and domestic plants. Both job cre-
ation and job destruction rates are mostly higher in domestic than in foreign-owned plants.
As a result, the mean gross job reallocation rate over the two decades is higher for domestic
plants (16.36%) than for foreign plants (13.14%). Over the period from 1980 to 2000 there
is overall job destruction, which is in line with the decline in manufacturing employment as
seen in Table 4.1. When looking at job creation and job destruction in plants that undergo
a change in ownership, in most years foreign acquisitions generate more employment than
they destroy. On average there is also more job creation and less job destruction in the
year of foreign acquisition than is the case for continuing foreign plants. However, the
volatility of job creation and destruction in acquisitions is much higher than in plants that
do not change owner. Foreign divestures seem to destroy more jobs than they create, but
the mean number of foreign divestures per year is less than half that of foreign acquisitions
and varies substantially over time (cf. Table 4.1). Thus, the volatility in job creation and
job destruction rates for foreign divestures is also very high.
Grouping the results for all manufacturing sectors together may hide differences in job
creation and destruction rates in the different sectors as well as differences between foreign
and domestic plants. To investigate this we calculate the numbers in Table 4.2 separately
for nine 2-digit sectors, and present the resulting means of annual values in Table 4.8 in
the Appendix. With the exceptions of the wood and paper sectors, job reallocation is
smaller in foreign than in domestic plants as is the case in the aggregate dynamics. Similar
to Table 4.2, in six of the nine sectors in Table 4.8, plants that are acquired by foreign
owners tend to increase employment rather than to reduce their workforce, while foreign
divestures on average are associated with net job destruction in eight of the nine sectors.
4.3.2 Productivity
We now turn to examining productivity dynamics in our different groups of plants. Plant
heterogeneity has been identified as the main driver of within-industry reallocation of
productivity. Changes in aggregate productivity are brought about by a combination
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of expansion and contraction within heterogenous plants, by market share reallocation
between plants, and by entry and exit. A substantial empirical literature that decomposes
productivity growth into the contributions of surviving, entering and exiting firms has
confirmed the importance of this reallocation process for aggregate productivity dynamics,
see Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a survey.
To measure total factor productivity (TFP) we use an index calculated at the plant
level as
lnTFPit = lnYit − αKt lnKit − αHt lnHit − αMt lnMit, (4.1)
where Yit is deflated plant output, measured as gross production value net of sales taxes
and subsidies. Hit is the number of person hours in the plant.8 Since only blue-collar hours
are reported prior to 1983, and only total hours from 1983, we estimate total hours before
1983 by using information on the blue-collar share of the total wage bill. Mit is the total
cost of materials used. Since this variable in the data includes rented labour and capital, we
subtract these and allocate them to the labour and capital measures respectively. Rented
labour hours are calculated from the costs of rented labour using the calculated average
wage for own employees. The details of the construction of our estimate of capital services
Kit can be found in the Appendix. We use separate price deflators for inputs and output
and for investment in buildings and machinery obtained from Statistics Norway. The
aggregation level for the price deflators is according to the sector classification used in
the National Accounts, which is somewhere in between the 2- and 3-digit ISIC level. In
equation 4.1 the αzt ’s are the 3-digit means of cost shares of each factor z relative to output
Yit. We impose constant returns to scale.9
Using this plant level TFP index, we calculate mean productivity in each 3-digit sector
for entrants, exitors, survivors and acquisitions as well as the deviation in mean produc-
tivity of all groups from domestic survivors in each sector. Table 4.3 presents the averages
of annual values for the periods 1980 to 1989 and 1990 to 2000.10 The table shows for-
eign survivors to be significantly more productive than domestic survivors in both periods.
Foreign entrants have higher productivity than domestic survivors as well, though this dif-
8A similar TFP measure is also used in the productivity decompositions by Foster et al. (2001), Disney
et al. (2003), and Møen (1998).
9Klette (1999) estimated scale parameters for different sectors of Norwegian manufacturing, and con-
cluded that constant returns to scale could not be rejected.
10Using labour productivity as an alternative measure yields a very similar picture for Table 4.3. How-
ever, the labour productivity differences between foreign and domestic plants are much larger than differ-
ences in terms of TFP, reflecting the fact that foreign plants are larger and more capital intensive than
domestic plants.
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ference is not significant. In contrast, domestic entrants have lower levels of productivity
than domestic survivors. This may be surprising; however, recent research with output
prices available demonstrates that entrants have higher physical productivity levels than
incumbents but charge lower prices, hence, their revenue based productivity advantage (as
measured here) is much less pronounced (Foster et al., 2005).11 Plants that exit have lower
productivity than domestic survivors, though this productivity deviation is not significant
for foreign exitors. Both foreign acquisitions and divestures have on average higher pro-
ductivity than domestic survivors in the year after the ownership change, although the
difference is significant only in the 1990s.
Table 4.3: Deviation from productivity of domestic survivors
1980s 1990s
Obs. TFP Obs. TFP
Domestic survivors 60,815 0.0 50,131 0.0
Foreign survivors 2,044 6.0∗ 5,422 5.0∗
Foreign divestures 184 2.9 369 4.8∗
Foreign acquisitions 268 3.1 944 5.6∗
Domestic entrants 1,652 -4.5∗ 1,434 -0.1
Foreign entrants 54 4.7 150 3.4
Domestic exitors 2,567 -13.2∗ 2,505 -11.0∗
Foreign exitors 86 -8.5 259 -0.1
∗ indicates significant difference from domestic survivors at the
5% level
In Table 4.3 the productivity levels of entrants, exitors, and plants that change owner-
ship represent only a single year for each plant. Foreign acquisitions are more productive
the year after ownership change than domestic survivors, but we cannot tell whether this
is due to the acquisition of high productivity domestic plants, or whether the ownership
change has induced an improvement in productivity. In order to look more closely at the
development of productivity around the time of ownership change, we follow plants from
two years before a change in ownership until two years after the ownership change. The
upper panel of Table 4.4 shows year-on-year TFP growth and the deviation in productivity
11The productivity of entrants is calculated the first year we observe the plant. For small plants, the
first year may be more subject to data problems. If we calculate the productivity of entrants the second
year, domestic entrants no longer have lower productivity than domestic survivors. We then get a TFP
deviation for domestic entrants of -0.2 in the 1980s and 0.7 in the 1990s.
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from domestic survivors for foreign acquisitions and foreign divestures. We also present
the figures for job creation, job destruction and net employment flows.12
Plants that are acquired by foreign owners do not seem to perform exceptionally well
before takeover. In the two years before domestic plants are taken over by foreign owners,
they have on average negative productivity growth and are less productive than other
domestic surviving plants. On average these plants also reduce employment before foreign
takeover.13 For the average acquired plant this process is reversed in the year of the
ownership change and continues over the next two years with productivity increases and net
employment creation.14 For foreign divestures, the trends in productivity and employment
before and after a domestic takeover are not as clear as in the case of foreign acquisitions.
In addition to ownership changes, Table 4.4 also includes productivity and employment
dynamics in entrants and exitors. We follow entrants for 4 years after entry, and exitors
for 4 years before exit, and include only plants that do not change ownership during the
tracking period. Employment dynamics in entrants is very similar to that presented for
US manufacturing plants in Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). Entrants have large net job
creation rates the first years after entry, and then job creation falls as the plants get older.
During the first four years of operation net employment creation is smaller in foreign than
in domestic entrants. With the exception of the second year after entry, foreign entrants
impress with their performance in productivity growth and productivity levels relative to
domestic survivors. Overall, they seem to perform better in terms of productivity than
domestic entrants the first four years after entry. Foreign and domestic exits perform
similarly, their productivity deteriorates before exit and they reduce employment before
closing down. Foreign plants seem to close down at higher productivity levels than domestic
plants since their productivity levels are closer to that of the domestic survivors than is
the case for domestic exitors (cf. the TFP-Dev. columns).
12The results are based on selecting plants that undergo one ownership change during the five year
period, and with entry more than 2 years before and exit more than 2 years after the ownership change.
Around 10% of ownership changes end in plant exit within 2 years after the ownership change. This share
is the same for foreign acquisitions and foreign divestures.
13Note that also 5 to 3 years before a foreign takeover these plants show negative or small productivity
growth, minor deviations in productivity from domestic survivors and, with the exception of year 5 before
the acquisition, net job destruction. Hence the poor performance of these plants in the two years prior to
the ownership change cannot only be attributed to possible insecurity in the expectation of a takeover.
14When estimating employment effects of foreign acquisitions, Girma and Görg (2004) find some evidence
that takeovers reduce employment growth in the UK electronics industry.
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Table 4.4: Productivity and employment dynamics in entrants, exitors and acquisitions
TFP Employment TFP Employment
Age ∆ Dev JC JD Net ∆ Dev JC JD Net
Foreign acquisitions Foreign divestures
-2 -0.5 -1.1 6.3 8.4 -2.1 -1.5 -0.5 8.0 5.1 2.9
-1 -2.6 -1.0 5.7 11.7 -6.1 1.5 0.6 10.7 7.9 2.9
0 2.5 2.9 9.5 8.3 1.2 1.5 2.6 6.1 34.6 -28.5
1 1.6 3.5 8.9 6.0 2.9 -5.9 -0.2 24.7 19.8 4.9
2 0.2 2.5 7.8 5.9 1.9 5.5 6.8 10.1 16.5 -6.3
Foreign entry Domestic entry
1 6.7 10.7 24.1 10.9 13.2 4.0 0.8 31.3 6.7 24.7
2 -10.9 -4.0 17.7 5.5 12.2 1.5 2.5 17.1 8.0 9.1
3 9.4 5.6 10.6 9.5 1.1 -0.6 1.9 13.9 8.6 5.3
4 4.8 11.2 10.5 12.7 -2.2 -0.8 2.2 13.4 7.8 5.6
Foreign exit Domestic exit
-3 4.1 5.1 8.3 8.2 0.1 -1.0 -3.2 7.2 10.7 -3.5
-2 -10.2 -2.9 3.7 12.8 -9.1 -1.2 -5.0 8.1 9.9 -1.9
-1 -1.2 -5.5 10.0 11.1 -1.1 -1.3 -5.7 8.1 12.7 -4.6
0 1.0 -2.5 12.0 31.4 -19.4 -5.9 -11.6 6.2 26.4 -20.1
Figures are averages of annual values from 1980-2000.
∆ = Growth rate from t− 1 to t, Dev = Difference from TFP level of domestic
survivors in year t.
4.4 Contributions to aggregate productivity growth and
employment creation
So far we have seen that foreign-owned plants are generally more productive than domes-
tic plants. In order to assess the contribution of foreign plants to aggregate productivity
growth in Norwegian manufacturing, we continue with a decomposition of productivity
growth. Decompositions of productivity are a common method to analyse the sources of
aggregate productivity growth at the industry level. The method calculates the contribu-
tions to productivity growth coming from changes within and between existing plants in
addition to entry and exit.
Different methods to decompose productivity growth have been proposed by Baily et al.
(1992), Griliches and Regev (1995), Olley and Pakes (1996) and Haltiwanger (1997). We
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use the decomposition proposed by Haltiwanger (1997). This approach tracks changes in
productivity relative to a reference point (i.e. industry averages) and is therefore straight-
forward to interpret.15 The decomposition starts from an index of industry level produc-
tivity
Pt =
∑
i
θitpit,
where Pt is the index of aggregate industry productivity in year t, θit is the output market
share of plant i in the industry and pit is the plant’s productivity measure.
In our case pit is the TFP measure described in equation (4.1), with the cost shares αzt
replaced by the average of year t and t−k. According to Haltiwanger (1997) the change in
industry productivity between period t and t− k can then be decomposed in the following
way
∆Pt =
∑
i²S,A
θi,t−k∆pit +
∑
i²S,A
∆θit (pi,t−k − Pt−k) +
∑
i²S,A
∆θit∆pit
+
∑
i²N
θit (pit − Pt−k)−
∑
i²X
θi,t−k (pi,t−k − Pt−k) , (4.2)
where S, A, N and X denote plants that survive, plants that survive and are acquired,
plants that enter and exit between t and t − k, respectively. We take k to be 5 in the
following decompositions. The first line in equation (4.2) shows the contribution to pro-
ductivity growth from surviving and - in our case - acquired plants. We split the surviving
plants into 4 groups: plants that are domestic all years between t−k and t, plants that are
foreign all years between t−k and t, plants that change ownership and end up as foreign in
year t (foreign acquisitions), and plants that change ownership and end up as domestic in
year t (foreign divestures). The contributions from survivors and acquisitions can be split
into three parts: The first term in equation (4.2) shows the contribution to productivity
growth from changes within surviving and acquired plants, the ‘within’ effect. The sec-
ond term is the ‘between’ plants effect, which is positive if those plants that initially had
above average TFP are the ones that gain market shares. The third term is a ‘covariance’
term that will be positive if plants with positive productivity growth increase their market
shares or plants with negative productivity growth lose market shares. The last two terms
15A full discussion of the differences between alternative decomposition methods is provided in Foster et
al. (2001) and in Disney et al. (2003). Petrin and Levinsohn (2005) examine the aggregation of plant-level
measures of productivity growth to the economy-wide level in productivity decompositions. They also look
at how productivity growth relates to welfare.
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represent the contributions to productivity growth accounted for by entry and exit.
Figure 4.2: Business Cycle and TFP
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Figure 4.2 plots our measure of aggregate productivity growth from equation (4.2)
against GDP growth in Norway. Productivity growth in manufacturing corresponds closely
to the business cycle over the 2 decades. In order to compare two similar time periods in
terms of the business cycle, we select the two periods of expansion ending at the peaks in
1987 and 1997. Thus for the decomposition of productivity growth we focus on the periods
1982-1987 and 1992-1997.
Table 4.5 shows the components of the decomposition. Entrants have market shares
of around 6% in both periods. The market share of exiting plants is also rather constant
at just below 10%. The big change from the boom during the 1980s to the boom during
the 1990s is the increase in market shares of foreign plants, part of which is due to the
inclusion of indirect foreign ownership in the 1990s. Taking foreign survivors and foreign
acquisitions together, their market share increased from 8% in 1982 to 38% in 1992. In the
TFP-columns of Table 4.5, the productivity of entrants in year t is compared to aggregate
productivity in t-5, and we see that foreign entrants are more productive than domestic
entrants and substantially more productive than the average as well.
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Both domestic and foreign exitors have below average productivity, similar to the pat-
tern in Table 4.3. Plants that experience foreign acquisitions have below average produc-
tivity before acquisition, in line with Table 4.4. From Table 4.5 also note that foreign
survivors have higher productivity growth than domestic survivors.
Table 4.5: Components of the TFP decomposition
Plants Market share TFP TFP growth
82-87 92-97 82-87 92-97 82-87 92-97 82-87 92-97
Domestic survivors 5,327 3,971 75.24 49.29 -3.84 -7.06 4.41 1.80
Foreign survivors 122 314 5.88 23.95 -2.59 -3.72 11.55 4.87
Foreign divestures 77 90 7.08 2.63 5.20 -9.50 14.07 5.40
Foreign acquisitions 86 255 2.38 14.01 -3.10 -4.37 -1.83 6.34
Domestic entrants 849 651 5.05 4.13 2.34 -1.34
Foreign entrants 36 84 0.62 2.10 17.99 10.52
Domestic exitors 1,129 1,108 9.02 8.35 -10.10 -14.59
Foreign exitors 32 114 0.39 1.77 -7.90 -11.14
Market shares are aggregated from 3-digit level using 3-digit output shares. Entrants’ market
share is calculated in year t, survivors’ and exitors’ in t-5.
TFP columns show average deviations from aggregate 3-digit TFP. For entrants it is the de-
viation of plant-level TFP in year t from aggregate TFP in t-5, for exitors and survivors we
compute the deviation in t-5.
The TFP growth columns show unweighted average TFP growth from t-5 to t.
Table 4.6 shows the results of the decomposition of aggregate TFP growth according
to equation (4.2). As in most other TFP decompositions, productivity growth within
surviving plants is the dominant driver of aggregate TFP growth. The total within effect
accounts for 61% of aggregate TFP growth in the 1982-1987 period,16 while its contribution
is reduced to 43% in the 1992-1997 period. In line with their small market share, foreign
plants play a negligible role in the within effect during the 1982-1987 period. Over the
period 1992-1997 productivity growth in foreign survivors and foreign acquisitions accounts
for 95% of the growth coming from productivity increases in surviving plants. The between
effect for surviving plants is negative in both periods for domestic and foreign plants,
indicating that surviving plants with above average productivity in the base year lose
market shares over the 5-year periods under consideration. The covariance effect is positive;
16Calculated as the sum of the within entries for foreign and domestic survivors and acquisitions
(4.75+0.38+1.99+0.16) divided by total TFP growth (11.87).
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Table 4.6: Decomposition of TFP growth for 1982-1987 and 1992-1997
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Period 1982-1987 1992-1997
Survivors-within 4.75 0.38 0.14 1.35
Survivors-between -0.78 -0.15 -0.55 -0.27
Survivors-covariance 3.65 0.27 2.28 0.89
Acquisitions-within 1.99 0.16 0.00 1.34
Acquisitions-between 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00
Acquisition-covariance 0.51 0.02 0.15 0.44
Entrants 0.72 0.10 0.22 0.30
Exitors 0.29 -0.03 0.21 -0.01
Total TFP growth 11.87 6.57
Domestic acquisitions correspond to what we elsewhere refer to as foreign
divestures.
which means that plants with positive productivity growth increase their market shares.
In Table 4.6 both the entry and exit effects are positive. This indicates that the entry and
exit process increases aggregate productivity growth, i.e. entrants are plants with above
average productivity while plants that exit have below average productivity.
Based on table 4.6 we calculate the share of total productivity growth accounted for
by each group of plants in the two periods. The results are presented in the first column
of Table 4.7. In addition, Table 4.7 presents the contribution to job creation and job
destruction over the two 5-year periods. From the table we see that net entry of foreign
and domestic plants accounts for about 10% of TFP growth in both periods. This is slightly
below a net entry effect of 14% for the US between 1982-1987 (Foster et al., 2001).17 From
1982 to 1987 there is net job destruction in Norwegian manufacturing. 60% of the net
reduction in employment is due to the exit of domestic plants destroying more jobs than
the new domestic entrants create. During the boom from 1992 to 1997 there is net job
creation in manufacturing. This is entirely due to job creation in surviving plants, as the
process of domestic entry and exit still wipes out jobs.
In line with the small market share of 8% (cf. Table 4.5) for foreign plants in the 1982-
17The role of net entry or plant turnover in aggregate productivity growth is likely to be larger than
what productivity decompositions suggest. The entry of new and efficient plants may increase competition
and induce surviving plants to perform better. Bartelsman et al. (2004) demonstrate that plant turnover
enhances productivity in surviving plants across a large number of developed and developing countries.
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Table 4.7: Percentage of job creation and productivity growth due to
different groups of plants
Share in Prod. Employment Growth
Growth Net JC JD
1982-1987
Domestic Survivors 64.2 21.9 60.9 47.3
Foreign Survivors 4.2 2.3 2.5 2.5
Foreign Divestures 21.1 12.2 1.5 5.2
Foreign Acquisitions 1.6 2.9 1.7 2.1
Domestic entry/exit 8.5 60.6 30.7 41.2
Foreign entry/exit 0.6 0.0 2.7 1.7
Total growth/jobs 11.9 -27,429 51,186 -78,615
1992-1997
Domestic Survivors 28.5 144.3 47.7 23.7
Foreign Survivors 30.0 13.6 8.8 7.7
Foreign Divestures 3.5 9.1 3.1 1.6
Foreign Acquisitions 27.1 33.8 10.6 4.8
Domestic entry/exit 6.5 -103.7 21.5 52.7
Foreign entry/exit 4.4 2.8 8.3 9.6
Total growth/jobs 6.6 12,089 60,681 -48,592
Where numbers in the columns do not add up to 100, this is due to
rounding.
1987 period, the contribution of foreign firms to both employment change and productivity
growth is also small, 5-6%. During this period in the 1980s, the domestic survivors account
for 64% of productivity growth and 22% of net job destruction. Ten years later the market
share of foreign plants has increased to 38%, and the overall share of productivity growth
attributed to foreign plants increased by even more to 61%. With respect to net job cre-
ation, the domestic survivors are by far the largest contributors to employment growth, but
also plants that are acquired by foreign owners are substantial contributors to employment
growth.
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4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we analyse employment and productivity dynamics in foreign and domestic
plants over two decades. In addition to the standard treatment of entrants, survivors and
exitors, we also consider foreign acquisitions and foreign divestures as additional groups.
The presence of foreign ownership in Norwegian manufacturing increased substantially from
the 1980s to the 1990s. All types of foreign plants are on average more productive than
their domestic counterparts. Thus, along with the increase in market shares of foreign-
owned plants, their contribution to productivity growth and employment dynamics also
increased. We find that both job creation rates and job destruction rates are larger in
domestic than in foreign plants. Plants that are acquired by foreign owners create more
jobs than they destroy in the year of acquisition, while the opposite seems to be the case
for plants where foreigners reduce their ownership interests.
We compare two 5-year periods at similar points of the business cycle, and find that
the contribution of entry and exit of plants accounted for about 10% of aggregate man-
ufacturing productivity growth in both the boom during the 1980s and the boom during
the 1990s. In both periods the entry and exit process was associated with net employment
destruction. Foreign entrants are more productive than domestic entrants, and foreign
plants also seem to close down at higher productivity levels than domestic exitors.
The main mode of foreign entry into Norwegian manufacturing in the 1990s is by for-
eign acquisition. Foreign owners do not seem to ‘cherry-pick’ when targeting domestic
takeover candidates. In fact, they manage to reverse a negative trend in productivity in
the acquired plant and they are also likely to generate employment after the change in
ownership. During the boom from 1992 to 1997, foreign surviving plants and foreign ac-
quisitions taken together were the largest contributors to productivity growth in Norwegian
manufacturing. What is more, foreign acquisitions are second only to domestic surviving
plants in generating employment, and they create more jobs than foreign surviving plants.
Thus, the common perception that foreign firms buy domestic firms to strip their assets
and lay off their employees in order to generate productivity growth is not confirmed in
this analysis.
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Construction of the capital measure
Kit, our estimate of capital services, is constructed from the following aggregation:
Kit = Rit + (0.07 + δ
m)V mit + (0.07 + δ
b)V bit,
where Rit is the cost of rented capital in the plant, V mit and V bit are the estimated values
of machinery and buildings at the beginning of the year, δm = 0.06 and δb = 0.02 are the
depreciation rates. We take the rate of return to capital to be 0.07. The output and input
definitions and values for depreciation rates and the rate of return to capital rely in large
part on previous work with this data. See Chapter 2 and references therein. The estimated
values of buildings and machinery are obtained from information on fire insurance values.
To reduce noise and avoid discarding too many observations with missing fire insurance
values, we smooth these values using the perpetual inventory method. Fire insurance
values are not recorded after 1995, thus from 1996 we estimate capital values by adding
investments and taking account of depreciation. Where possible, we also use estimates of
firm level capital values (distributed to the plant level according to employment shares)
as starting values for plants with entry after 1995. These capital values are obtained from
recent work by Raknerud et al. (2003) to improve on capital estimates in Norwegian
manufacturing.
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